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achieving their objectives? Assessing their effectiveness is complicated by selection bias; countries
which change their capital-flow management measures (CFMs) often share specific characteristics
and are responding to changes in variables that the CFMs are intended to influence. This paper addresses
these challenges by using a propensity-score matching methodology. We also create a new database
with detailed information on weekly changes in controls on capital inflows, capital outflows, and macroprudential
measures related to international transactions from 2009 to 2011 for 60 countries. Results show that
these macroprudential measures can significantly reduce some measures of financial fragility. Most
CFMs do not significantly affect other key targets, however, such as exchange rates, capital flows,
interest-rate differentials, inflation, equity indices, and different volatilities. One exception is that removing
controls on capital outflows may reduce real exchange rate appreciation. Therefore, certain CFMs
can be effective in accomplishing specific goals—but most popular measures are not “good for” accomplishing
their stated aims
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1. Introduction 
Over the last few years, economists and policymakers have become more supportive of “capital-flow 
management” measures (CFMs) to address the negative effects of large and volatile capital flows. This 
support has been bolstered by a series of IMF papers developing scenarios in which different CFMs 
should be “part of a policy toolkit”, as well as a series of theoretical papers modeling how CFMs can 
increase social welfare.1
 
 A number of countries have followed these recommendations and over 40 
countries have adjusted their CFMs at least once from just 2009 through 2011. The stated purpose of 
these recent changes in CFMs includes: limiting exchange rate appreciation, reducing portfolio inflows, 
providing greater monetary policy independence, reducing inflation, reducing volatility, and/or reducing 
specific measures of financial fragility (such as bank leverage, credit growth, asset bubbles, foreign-
currency exposure, or short-term liabilities). But can CFMs accomplish any of these goals? If the answer 
is affirmative, CFMs could help stabilize economies experiencing substantial capital flow volatility driven 
by external factors (see Bluedorn et al., 2013).  
CFMs refer to two types of measures: (1) capital controls or any types of restrictions on cross-border 
financial activity that discriminate based on residency; and (2) macroprudential measures which do not 
discriminate based on residency, but relate to cross-border or foreign-currency exposure and lending. This 
definition does not include prudential regulations targeting individual institutions or macroprudential 
regulations unrelated to cross-border exposure.2 Most papers have found little or mixed evidence that 
capital controls affect exchange rates, the volume of capital flows, monetary policy independence, and 
other macroeconomic variables, but stronger evidence that they can significantly affect the composition of 
capital flows and specific measures of financial vulnerability.3
                                                          
1 Key IMF papers are: IMF (2011a, 2011b, 2012) and Ostry et al. (2010, 2011).  Key theoretical papers are: Korinek 
(2010, 2011), Jeanne and Korinek (2010), Costinot, Lorenzoni, and Werning (2011), and Jeanne (2012, 2013). 
 The IMF writes that: “Because capital 
controls have been used many times in the past, evidence on their effects is more abundant but still 
surprisingly inconclusive.” (Blanchard et al., 2013, pg. 20) Empirical evidence on the effectiveness of 
macroprudential measures is even more limited, partially due to their infrequent use before 2009. The 
IMF admits that: “Empirical evidence on the effectiveness of these measures is scant….” (Blanchard et 
al., 2013, pg. 17)  
2 See IMF (2012, page 40) for the “institutional” definition of CFMs. For example, this measure includes restrictions 
on exposure to mortgage debt denominated in foreign currency but does not include restrictions on exposure to 
mortgage debt based on loan-to-value or debt-to-income ratios. 
3 For recent surveys of this literature that show limited effects of capital controls, see Forbes (2007a), Cline (2010), 
Magud, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2011), Klein (2012), and IMF (2013). For more recent evidence that controls and 
macroprudential measures may improve a country’s liability structure and increase its resilience to crises, see Ostry 
et al. (2012), Ostry et al. (2010), and IMF (2013). For mixed evidence from just Brazil’s recent use of capital 
controls, see Forbes et al. (2012), Chamon and Garcia (2013), and Jinjarak et al. (2013). 
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This inconclusive series of results is not surprising given major challenges in assessing the impact of 
capital controls and macroprudential measures: data limitations and selection bias (related to both time-
invariant country characteristics as well as time-varying values of outcome variables and other policy 
choices). Selection bias can occur because countries which adjust their CFMs tend to have different 
characteristics than other countries. For example, estimates in this paper show that countries with stronger 
institutions are significantly more likely to remove controls on capital outflows and increase 
macroprudential measures. A time-varying form of this bias can also occur because governments tend to 
adjust their CFMs in response to changes in key variables which the CFMs are intended to influence. For 
example, estimates in this paper show that countries are more likely to increase controls on capital 
inflows and reduce controls on outflows after a currency appreciation. This paper addresses these 
econometric challenges by using a propensity-score matching methodology. This methodology is fairly 
new to the macro and international economics literatures, but has been used for years in medical and labor 
economics.4
 
 This methodology has a number of advantages over standard estimation techniques for the 
analysis in this paper, including its ability to avoid strong assumptions about functional form while 
addressing non-random sample selection by putting more weight on similar countries. 
In order to analyze the impact of capital controls and macroprudential measures using propensity-score 
matching, it is necessary to construct a new database with information on CFMs at a higher frequency and 
for a larger sample of countries than previously existed. More detailed information is needed for this 
methodology in order to construct accurate control groups, as well as to capture all changes in capital 
controls and macroprudential measures. (In contrast, most other datasets only capture initial changes in 
CFMs, but not subsequent adjustments of similar measures.) Therefore, we compile detailed information 
on increases and decreases in controls on capital inflows, controls on capital outflows, and 
macroprudential measures at a weekly frequency for 60 countries from 2009 through 2011. We also 
divide our database into: measures aimed at stemming capital inflows/appreciation/credit growth or 
outflows/depreciation/credit contractions; capital controls affecting equities, bonds, or FDI; 
macroprudential measures targeting banks or foreign exchange; and CFMs that were “major” in the sense 
they received substantial attention by investors.  
 
                                                          
4 See Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) for background on this methodology and Angrist and Pischke (2008) for an 
excellent discussion and examples from the labor literature. Persson (2001) is the earliest application of this 
approach to macroeconomic, time series data. Differences between propensity-score matching and more traditional 
regression analysis, as well as recent examples in which propensity-score matching is starting to be used to address a 
international and macroeconomic topics, are discussed in Section 3.1 and Appendix C. 
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Then we use this new database to estimate the probability that a country changes a particular type of 
capital control or macroprudential measure each week based on a set of observable domestic and global 
variables. We focus on predicting changes in CFMs directed at reducing pressures related to capital 
inflows (increased controls on inflows, decreased controls on outflows, and increased macroprudential 
regulations) as these were the primary tools utilized over the sample period from 2009 through 2011. 
These estimates provide intuitive results on which global variables, macroeconomic policies, and 
domestic characteristics influence a country’s choice to adjust its CFMs. The estimates show that there 
are significant differences in the institutions and macroeconomic characteristics of countries that use these 
policies, and that key variables intended to be influenced by CFMs (such as exchange rates and credit 
growth) can significantly affect the probability of using each policy —confirming that it is crucial to 
account for selection bias in the analysis.  
 
The results of these logit models are then used to estimate propensity scores—the probability that each 
country changes its CFMs in each week as a function of observable variables. Another crucial advantage 
of the methodology is that it allows us to include a large number of observable variables and therefore be 
agnostic about the underlying model. PSM basically reduces the many potential observables that may 
influence the choice of whether or not a country adjusts a CFM to a single dimension captured in the 
propensity score. These propensity scores are used to match each member of the “treated group” (country-
week observations with changes in CFMs) with a control group (country-weeks with no changes in 
CFMs). We use five different algorithms to perform this matching (nearest-neighbor without replacement, 
five-nearest neighbors, radius, kernel, and local-linear) and report a series of tests evaluating if they 
satisfy key assumptions. Then we use these matched samples to estimate the average treatment effect on 
the treated (ATT) of each of the capital controls and macroprudential measures on a series of outcome 
variables. We estimate the cumulative effects for each week over a six-month window (or longer) on 
variables that are frequently cited as goals for adjusting CFMs: the exchange rate, portfolio flows, other 
macroeconomic variables (interest-rate differentials, equity markets, and inflation), financial market 
volatilities (for the exchange rate, portfolio flows, and interest rates) and other financial vulnerabilities 
(private credit growth, bank credit growth, inflation expectations, bank leverage, and exposure to short-
term external debt, portfolio liabilities, and foreign-currency liabilities).  
 
The results indicate that CFMs have significant effects on some of the variables which they are intended 
to influence—although most effects are insignificant, small in magnitude, and not robust across matching 
methodologies. The strongest and most robust effects of CFMs appear to be of increased macroprudential 
regulations on reducing certain measures of financial vulnerability. Increased macroprudential measures 
4 
 
significantly reduce bank leverage, inflation expectations, bank credit growth, and exposure to portfolio 
liabilities relative to the counterfactual (although the effect on portfolio liabilities reverses within a year). 
Increased controls on capital inflows reduce private credit growth over several months. 
 
In contrast to these robust results, there is more limited evidence that CFMs affect other primary goals—
including exchange rates and net capital flows. Changes in capital controls and macroprudential measures 
do not significantly affect aggregate portfolio flows or nominal or real exchange rates.5 The one exception 
is that removing controls on capital outflows can generate a significant depreciation of the real exchange 
rate—although the maximum estimated effect is a depreciation of less than 2.5% over 4 to 6 months 
relative to the counterfactual. There is also no evidence that changes in CFMs significantly affect other 
macroeconomic variables and financial market volatilities over the short- and medium-term, including 
equity returns, inflation, interest-rate differentials versus the United States, or the volatility of exchange 
rates, portfolio flows, or interest-rate differentials.6
 
  By improving specific measures of financial fragility, 
however, macroprudential measures may indirectly affect these macroeconomic variables and financial 
volatilities over longer periods of time. 
These results have important implications. Much of the recent debate on the use of CFMs to reduce 
exchange rate appreciation has focused on the use of controls on capital inflows. The results in this paper, 
however, indicate that removing controls on capital outflows (at least for countries which have 
preexisting controls) may be a more effective tool for systematically limiting exchange rate appreciation. 
Also, the debate on the use of capital controls (and to a lesser extent macroprudential measures) has 
historically focused on affecting the exchange rate, capital flows, and other macroeconomic variables. 
Only recently has the debate shifted toward using these tools to reduce other forms of financial 
vulnerability (i.e., Ostry et al., 2012). The evidence suggests that this new focus is likely to be more 
productive. Moreover, macroprudential regulations appear to be more effective than capital controls in 
improving most measures of financial stability, albeit with the important caveat that the distinction 
between these two categories is often difficult to make. Therefore, CFMs, and especially macroprudential 
measures, appear to be “good for” addressing specific variables related to financial fragility, but do not 
appear to be as effective in influencing other targets.  
 
                                                          
5 Although we do not find systematic evidence that controls on capital inflows can influence capital flows or 
exchange rates, this does not imply that such controls can never work. In fact, Forbes et al. (2012) find that Brazil’s 
taxes on portfolio inflows from 2008 to 2011 significantly reduced equity inflows into Brazil. Section 4.2 tests if 
specific types of CFMs or CFMs in certain countries had different effects than CFMs in general.  
6 The one exception is that increased macroprudential regulations may reduce interest rate differentials for short 
periods of time by a small amount and may actually increase—instead of decrease—the volatility of portfolio flows. 
5 
 
These results, however, should be assessed with several important caveats. First, the analysis is only able 
to consider the short- and medium-term effects of capital-flow management measures. We do not evaluate 
any effects after six months due to limits of the estimation technique. It is certainly possible that capital 
controls—especially macroprudential measures—have additional effects after this six-month window that 
will not be captured in the analysis. Second, although the paper finds several significant benefits of 
capital-flow management measures, and especially macroprudential measures, in reducing some forms of 
financial fragility, the analysis does not make any attempt to assess the costs of these measures. 
Macroprudential regulations and capital controls will involve certain costs, and a full cost-benefit analysis 
should be applied before implementing these policies. Finally, although our results imply that capital 
controls and macroprudential measures are not “good for” accomplishing many of their stated goals, it is 
possible that the apparent lack of effectiveness results from the policies being poorly enforced, poorly 
calibrated, poorly communicated, poorly timed, or poorly implemented in any other way. As these tools 
are more widely used and better understood, they could be more effective in the future.  
 
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the new dataset on changes in capital 
controls and macroprudential measures created for this paper. Section 3 discusses the propensity-score 
methodology, uses this methodology to estimate the probability that each country adjusts its CFMs, and 
then uses these estimates to calculate propensity scores to match each “treatment” with its control group. 
This section also evaluates the performance of each of the matching algorithms. Section 4 uses the 
matched groups to estimate the effects of CFMs on key outcome variables and includes a series of 
extensions and robustness tests. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. Capital-Flow Management Events and Dataset 
In order to construct a database of capital-flow management events that allows us to evaluate the 
systematic effects of CFMs and that includes a large enough sample to use propensity-score matching 
effectively, we compile data on both capital controls and macroprudential measures at a weekly frequency 
for a larger set of countries than is typically used in this literature.7
                                                          
7 The most well-known databases on capital controls are Chinn and Ito (2008) and Schindler (2009), which is 
updated in Klein (2012). These use annual dummy variables to measure the existence of different types of capital 
controls and therefore do not capture many changes in controls. Recent studies with information on both capital 
controls and macroprudential measures are Pasricha (2012) and Ostry et al. (2012), which is expanded on in Beirne 
and Friedrich (2013). These datasets are also only at an annual frequency and for a more limited set of countries. 
 More specifically, we begin with all 
“Advanced Economies” (as defined by the International Monetary Fund as of October 2012) and all 
“Emerging Markets” and “Frontier Economies” (as defined by Standard & Poor’s BMI indices). We then 
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exclude current members of the euro area, the three largest advanced economies (the United States, 
United Kingdom, and Japan) and countries that do not have data on equity or bond flows. This yields a 
sample of 60 countries for our analysis, with additional information on sample selection and the final list 
of countries listed in Appendix A. 
 
Next, we use several sources to document weekly changes in CFMs during 2009, 2010, and 2011 for this 
sample of 60 countries. Our primary source is the Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions by the International Monetary Fund. We supplement this source with information 
from financial analyst reports, primary news sources, and academic papers on capital controls and 
macroprudential measures. The crucial criterion for including a policy as a change in capital controls or 
macroprudential measures is that it places any type of restriction on cross-border financial activity based 
on residency or cross-border or foreign currency exposures. We classify the selected measures into three 
major groups – controls on capital inflows, controls on capital outflows, and macroprudential measures. 
These classifications require some discretionary judgment, especially as the distinction between capital 
controls and macroprudential measures is often not clear in practice.  
 
More specifically, we define capital controls as measures that limit or restrict international capital 
transactions or that affect the transfers and payments associated with these transactions. Typical measures 
include taxes on cross-border flows from residents/non-residents, unremunerated reserve requirements 
(URR) on such flows, special licensing requirements, and even outright limits or bans on international 
transactions. Capital controls may apply to all cross-border financial flows, or may differentiate by the 
type or duration of the flow (i.e., debt, equity, or direct investment; short-term vs. longer-term). 
Macroprudential measures are defined as regulations focused on strengthening the ability of the overall 
domestic financial sector to cope with risks related to foreign exchange or international exposure. These 
measures do not directly target capital flows, but instead the balance-sheet risk which could result from 
these flows. Therefore, they often focus on the currency of the transaction or exposure, instead of the 
residency of the parties to the transaction. They commonly consist of limits on banks’ open foreign-
exchange (FX) position, limits on banks’ investments in FX assets, and differential reserve requirements 
on liabilities in local currency and FX. Our measure does not include other macroprudential regulations 
which are purely domestic and not related to cross-border exposure (such as on domestic mortgage 
lending). Appendix A provides specific examples of the types of measures which are (and are not) 
included in our definitions, as well as additional information on the database. 
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After constructing this database of changes in controls on capital inflows, controls on capital outflows, 
and macroprudential measures, we then further differentiate these CFMs by several criteria. We label 
each change in a CFM as an increase or decrease—with an increase meaning a new or stricter regulation 
and a decrease implying the removal or reduction in a regulation. We also classify each measure as 
affecting: equities, bonds/fixed income, foreign direct investment (FDI), loans, banks, and/or FX. In some 
cases, a CFM may simultaneously affect more than one of these categories.8
 
  CFMs affecting equities, 
bonds, and FDI are more often capital controls, and CFMs affecting banks, foreign exchange, and loans 
are more often macroprudential measures—but this division does not always hold. Finally, we also 
construct a variable classifying a CFM as “major” or not, based on whether it received attention by 
financial analysts and investors. (This variable is discussed in Section 4.2.)  
The resulting database includes 220 CFM events. Out of the 60 countries in the sample, 39 countries have 
at least one event during the period from 2009 to 2011. Table 1 lists the number of inflow controls, 
outflow controls, and macroprudential measures that were increased/added or decreased/removed by each 
country. It shows that mainly emerging markets and developing countries implemented changes in 
controls or macroprudential measures over this period, with only a few changes in advanced economies 
(such as the Czech Republic, Israel, South Korea, and Taiwan). The sample has more changes in 
macroprudential measures (121 events) than capital controls (99 events)—with the changes in capital 
controls evenly balanced between changes in controls on inflows (50 events) and outflows (49 events). 
The CFM events are also more heavily weighted toward policies affecting bonds (67) and equities (47) 
than FDI (18), and more often focus on foreign exchange (130) and banks (107) than loans (46). Our 
review of analyst comments indicates that 44 of the measures were viewed as “major” by investors.  
 
It is also possible to divide the CFM events into two groups—those responding to pressures related to 
large net capital inflows and those related to net outflows. More specifically, countries concerned about 
strong net capital inflows, currency appreciation, rapid credit growth, and related vulnerabilities can 
choose between increasing controls on capital inflows, reducing controls on capital outflows, and/or 
increasing macroprudential regulations. Countries concerned about sudden stops, currency depreciation, a 
contraction in credit, and/or related vulnerabilities can choose between decreasing controls on capital 
inflows, increasing controls on capital outflows, and/or decreasing macroprudential regulations. Figure 1 
and the right-hand columns of Table 1 show the incidence of changes in these two groups of CFMs from 
2009 through 2011.  The sample is weighted more heavily towards CFMs aimed at moderating capital 
                                                          
8 For example, a CFM affecting banks’ reserve requirements for foreign currency deposits would be classified as a 
CFM affecting banks and FX. 
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inflows (with 135 events compared to 85 with the opposite goal). This is not surprising as most of the 
period from 2009 through 2011 was a period of declining risk aversion, expansionary monetary policy in 
developed countries, and increasing global capital flows. In the analysis which follows, we focus on the 
impact of this larger group of CFM events aimed at moderating capital inflows and which have received 
the greatest attention by policymakers.9
 
  
Our new dataset on CFM events is then merged with information from several different sources to create 
the final database for this paper. Weekly market information on global risk (the VIX and TED spread), 
commodity prices, interest rates (overnight and on 3-monthTreasuries), equity market indices, and the 
nominal exchange rate is taken from Datastream, Global Financial Data, Haver, and JPMorgan. Weekly 
capital flow data on equity and bond flows and asset positions (adjusted for valuation changes) is taken 
from Emerging Portfolio Fund Research (EPFR). Monthly macroeconomic information on real exchange 
rates, private credit, foreign exchange reserves, GDP, CPI inflation, and GDP per capita is taken from the 
IMF and supplemented with data from the ECB as needed. Monthly measures of institutional quality are 
measured by the legal compliance index taken from the ICRG database. Information on a country’s 
exchange rate regime is the de facto arrangement as measured in Ghosh et al. (2011), and information on 
past capital account openness is from Chinn and Ito (2008, updated as of 04/24/2013). Other information 
on stock market capitalization, country financial exposure, and liabilities is from the World Bank’s Global 
Financial Development Database (and in some cases supplemented by the ECB). Detailed information on 
this data, including sources and definitions, is in Appendix B. 
 
3. Propensity-Score Methodology, Estimating Scores, and Matching  
To estimate the impact of the CFMs, we use a propensity-score matching methodology. This section 
begins by summarizing this methodology. Then it uses a broad vector of observable variables to estimate 
a logit model of each country’s choice to use each type of CFM each week. The section ends by using the 
resulting estimates to calculate propensity scores and match each “treatment” with a control group. The 
next section uses these matched groups to estimate the effects of the CFMs on outcome variables. 
 
3.1 Propensity-Score Matching Methodology 
Countries that adjust their capital controls and/or macroprudential measures are often different from 
countries which do not make these policy choices. This selection bias or “non-random assignment” makes 
                                                          
9 We have also extended the analysis to other CFM measures related to concerns about capital outflows, currency 
depreciations, and related pressures (i.e., lifting controls on capital inflows and macroprudential measures and 
increasing controls on capital outflows). The more limited set of observations and global economic trends during the 
sample, however, complicate the analysis. 
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it difficult to assess whether differences in key outcome variables between countries that undertake these 
policies and those that do not are driven by the policies or simply by underlying differences in the two 
sets of countries.  One approach for adjusting for this selection bias is to use propensity-score matching.10
 
 
Persson (2001) provides compelling evidence of how propensity-score methodology can overturn 
standard cross-country regression results when countries which follow certain policies are systematically 
different than those which do not. This methodology has several advantages over standard regression 
methodology for this paper’s analysis and is summarized below. Appendix C, however, provides more 
details on the methodology, as well as concrete examples of how selection bias is a challenge for the 
analysis of CFMs and may not be satisfactorily addressed with standard regression techniques.  
To use the propensity-score methodology, define a “treated” observation as Di = 1, which is any week in 
which country i changes a CFM. Likewise Di = 0 are the “untreated” or “control” observations, which are 
any weeks when country i does not change a CFM. We also create an “exclusion window” for 3 months 
before and 3 months after a change in the CFM of interest.11
 
 During this exclusion window, a country 
cannot be used as a control observation—even if it makes no changes to the relevant CFM during those 
weeks. Also define Y1,i as the outcome variable (such as the change in the exchange rate) for the ith 
member of the treated group and Y0,i for the ith member of the untreated (control) group.  Summing over 
members of each group, we are able to observe E[Y1,i|Di=1] and E[Y0,i|Di=0]. The variable in which we 
are interested, however, is the “average treatment effect on the treated” or ATT, which is not observable 
and is written as:  
ATT = E[Y1,i – Y0,i|Di=1].               (1) 
 
The difference in the two observable statistics is a combination of the key variable of interest (the ATT) 
and sampling bias (E[Y0,i|Di=1]  –  E[Y0,i|Di=0] ). This sampling bias is the difference in outcomes that is 
                                                          
10 See Dehejia and Wahba (2002) and Angrist and Pischke (2008, chapter 3) for excellent summaries of this 
methodology. Also see Heinrich, Maffioli, and Vazquez (2010) for a non-technical overview. This technique is just 
starting to be used in the international/macro/monetary economics literature. Recent examples are: Angrist and 
Kuersteiner (2011) and Angrist, Jordá, and Kuersteiner (2013) on monetary policy; Glick, Guo, and Hutchison 
(2006), Das and Bergstrom (2012), and Levchenko, Rancière, and Thoenig (2009) on financial liberalization; Chari, 
Chen, and Dominguez (2011) on foreign ownership; Forbes and Klein (2013) on crisis responses; and Jordà and 
Taylor (2013) on fiscal policy. 
11 This exclusion window prevents labelling countries which recently changed or are about to change a CFM as a 
control observation. It also prevents matching treated observations for one country with control observations for the 
same country at slightly different points in time. Moreover, given the many factors which determine when a change 
in a CFM occurs, we do not expect to be able to predict the exact week in which a change is made. We focus on a 3-
month exclusion window, as Forbes et al. (2012) find that changes in Brazil’s capital controls from 2009 to 2011 can 
affect capital flows for more than a month, but no longer than 3 months.  
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attributable to differences in the treated and control group (such as different country characteristics) rather 
than any effect of the treatment itself. Any sampling bias between the treated and control groups would be 
straightforward to adjust for if the units i differed along one or two discrete and measurable dimensions. 
This is not feasible, however, when comparing countries which vary across a number of dimensions.  
 
Propensity-score matching can address this challenge.  This methodology matches countries that 
undertake the treatment (i.e., policy change) to a subset of countries that do not, based on a set of 
observable country characteristics, represented by the vector Xi for the ith country.  Moreover, Rosenbaum 
and Rubin (1985) show that it is sufficient to match treated and control observations based on a 
“propensity score,” p(Xi), which is a scalar variable that is the probability that country i receives the 
treatment (Di).  More specifically, the propensity score, p(Xi) is: 
 
p(Xi) = Pr[Di=1|Xi] .         (2)   
 
In our case, the propensity score is the conditional probability of a country adjusting its CFMs given pre-
treatment characteristics, Xi, which include country-specific and global variables.  
 
After the propensity scores have been estimated, there are several algorithms that can be used to match 
each treated observation with the controls.  We focus on five matching algorithms, each of which has 
advantages and disadvantages. There are several tests to assess the accuracy of the matching and whether 
the algorithm removes significant differences between the treated and control groups. These tests and 
statistics are discussed in more detail in Section 3.3 when they are used. If these tests are satisfied, it is 
then possible to estimate the ATT as: 
 
ATT = E[Y1,i|Di=1, p(Xi)]  –  E[Y0,i|Di=0, p(Xi)] .      (3) 
 
The ATT in equation 3 is the estimated treatment effect from the change in capital controls or 
macroprudential measures after controlling for selection bias. 
 
To conclude, it is useful to mention how this approach compares to the more familiar regression analysis 
based on OLS.  Multivariate regressions estimate the partial correlation of the treatment with the outcome 
variable and can control for the other variables included in the vector Xi.  Multivariate regressions can 
also be combined with instrumental variables—although finding “good instruments” that meet the 
exclusion restrictions is often challenging. One important advantage of propensity-score matching over 
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multivariate regression analysis, however, is that matching does not require assumptions about a linear 
relationship between the treatments, covariates, and outcomes. Propensity-score estimation puts greater 
emphasis on modeling the policy change (the changes in CFMs), and it is not necessary to assume any 
functional form between any of the variables and the outcomes. This is particularly useful when the 
underlying model is unclear, including with respect to uncertain lag length, simultaneity, and 
endogeneity. Moreover, this methodology allows the inclusion of a large set of observable variables to 
determine the propensity score. This is particularly useful for our estimation as there is little theoretical 
guidance on exactly which variables should be included in the model. Although these advantages have 
been well-known in cross-section analysis, Angrist and Kuersteiner (2011) estimate the impact of 
monetary policy shocks and demonstrate that these advantages of propensity-score methodology are also 
useful in time-series, cross-section models, including in the presence of endogeneity and simultaneity.  
 
Another important difference between standard regression analysis and the propensity-score methodology 
is the weighting of the observations in the control group.12
 
  In both approaches, it is necessary to construct 
weights for the difference between treated and untreated values in order to calculate the average effect for 
the whole sample.  In propensity-score matching, the greatest weights are put on observations 
representing the highest likelihood of being treated but weren’t (i.e., the control observations most 
“similar” to the treated observations).  In contrast, in regression analysis the greatest weights are placed 
on observations where the conditional variance of treatment status is larger (i.e., basically those 
observations with equal likelihood of being treated or untreated)—which may be observations that are not 
very “similar” to those in the treated group.  These two different weighting approaches can significantly 
affect the estimated average treatment effects. Put slightly differently, propensity-score matching will 
tend to reduce bias in the estimates by including a more relevant set of control observations, although it 
can also increase the variance due to the smaller number of observations in the control sample. 
Although propensity-score matching has a number of advantages over standard regression analysis for 
certain types of analysis, it also has several disadvantages and criteria which must be satisfied. A major 
challenge for much of the international/macroeconomic literature is having a sufficient number of 
“similar” observations to form a control group; this criteria is unlikely to be met in standard cross-
country, annual datasets which only have data on the key “observable” variables for a limited set of 
                                                          
12 Angrist and Pischke (2008, Chapter 3) provide an excellent discussion of the similarities and differences between 
regression analysis and propensity-score matching. Also, although propensity-score matching can reduce asymptotic 
efficiency relative to a regression framework, Angrist and Hahn (2004) show that there can be efficiency gain in a 
finite sample, even if there are no asymptotic efficiency gains. Given the small size of our sample—this suggests 
that this potential drawback of the propensity-score methodology is less likely to be an issue. 
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countries and years. A second, and related, challenge is satisfying the balancing or independence 
assumption (discussed in more detail below). A third issue is that results can be sensitive to the matching 
methodology—thereby requiring robustness checks. A final challenge is incorporating the time-series 
dimension in the analysis—which may require some type of “exclusion window” around the treatment 
date (as discussed below).  
 
To provide a concrete example of the different results that can be obtained using propensity-score 
matching relative to standard regression analysis in the presence of selection bias, consider a simple 
example of how macroprudential regulations affect the real exchange rate. The first column of Table 2 
shows results of a regression estimating if increased macroprudential regulations relating to international 
transactions affect the percent change in the real exchange rate over the subsequent quarter. The positive 
and significant coefficient suggests that countries which increase these types of macroprudential 
regulations are more likely to have a significant real exchange rate appreciation (when not controlling for 
selection bias or other variables). As documented in Appendix C, however, countries which increase these 
macroprudential regulations are also more likely to have flexible exchange rates. Could this positive 
coefficient instead reflect differences between the types of countries which increase macroprudential 
regulations (selection bias) rather than an effect of regulations on the exchange rate?  
 
To test if the positive relationship between macroprudential regulations and subsequent exchange rate 
appreciation is caused by differences in exchange rate regimes or other omitted variables, standard 
regression analysis would add variables to the regression to control for these variables. Results, 
controlling for if the country has a floating exchange rate, and then the full set of control variables used 
later in this paper, are reported in columns 2 and 3 in Table 2.13
                                                          
13 Dummy variable indicating if a country has a floating exchange rate is from Ghosh et al. (2011). 
 Increasing macroprudential regulations 
still has a positive and significant effect on the real exchange rate (although the coefficient is only 
significant at the 10% level with the full set of controls variables). In contrast, a propensity-score 
methodology would divide the sample into groups of “more similar” countries, based on variables such as 
the country’s exchange rate regime, and then only estimate the effect of macroprudential regulations 
relative to similar countries. The analogy in the simple framework in Table 2 would be the estimates in 
columns 4 through 7. These estimates show that when only countries with flexible exchange rates are 
included in the regression, there is no longer any significant effect of increased macroprudential 
regulations on the exchange rate (with and without the full set of control variables). Countries that do 
NOT have a flexible exchange rate show a positive and significant relationship. This indicates that the 
positive impact of macroprudential measures on the real exchange rate estimated using standard OLS in 
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columns 1 through 3 could result from selection bias related to a country’s exchange rate regime. (This is 
confirmed in the full analysis using propensity-score matching in Section 4.1.) Propensity-score 
methodology puts greater weight on more similar countries and is therefore better able to adjust for these 
different relationships for countries with different types of exchange-rate regimes than simply including 
control variables in a standard OLS framework.  
 
3.2 First-Stage Logit Regressions and Propensity Scores 
In order to calculate the propensity scores predicting the probability a country changes its CFMs as 
specified in equation 2, we draw from the literature on the determinants of capital flows and capital 
controls.14
 
 Since our database on capital controls and macroprudential measures has a weekly frequency, 
we focus on covariates available at this frequency whenever possible. First, to control for changes in a 
country’s exchange rate and capital flows, we control for percent changes in the country’s real effective 
exchange rate and net portfolio inflows (over the last six months). Second, to control for increased 
inflation risk and credit growth—other reasons frequently cited as motivations for CFMs—we control for 
consensus CPI inflation forecasts and the percent change in private credit relative to GDP. 
Third, to control for common changes in global sentiment and relative rates of return (including the 
effects of monetary policy in developed economies) that could affect global capital flows, we control for 
global risk (measured by the VIX and the TED spread), commodity prices (measured by percent changes 
in the Dow Jones commodity price index), and changes in the interest-rate differential between each 
country and the United States (on 3-month Treasuries).15 Fourth, to control for different intervention 
strategies, exchange rate regimes, and past use of CFMs, we include the percent change in foreign 
exchange reserves to GDP, a dummy equal to one if the country has a floating exchange rate, and the 
Chinn-Ito measure of the country’s pre-existing capital account openness. Finally, to control for any 
effect of the size of a country’s financial sector, income level, and institutional strength, we also control 
for stock market capitalization (as a share of GDP), GDP per capita (in logarithmic form), and the 
country’s “legal compliance”.16
                                                          
14 See Aizenman and Pasricha (2013) for empirical evidence on determinants of a country’s use of controls on 
capital outflows and Fratzscher (2012) for evidence related to a country’s use of controls on capital inflows. See Lim 
et al. (2011) for the determinants of a country’s use of macroprudential measures. 
 For each variable measured in changes (or percent changes), we calculate 
the change  in the variable relative to the previous year in order to minimize any seasonal effects. We also 
15 Rey (2014), Forbes and Warnock (2012), and Fratzscher (2012) provide empirical evidence on the importance of 
global risk in determining capital flows. Fratzscher, Lo Duca, and Straub (2012) provide evidence of the role of U.S. 
monetary policy. 
16 Lim et al. (2011) highlight the importance of the size of existing financial markets. Habermeier et al. (2011) 
discuss how institutional features, such as administrative capacity and legal compliance, could also have an effect on 
the design and enforcement of CFMs. 
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lag all variables so that any change in the CFM occurs after the variable is measured.17 All variables are 
explained in detail in Appendix B.18
 
  
Therefore, our base regression used to explain changes in CFMs aimed at moderating capital inflows and 
related pressures from 2009 to 2011 can be written as:  
 
 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐶𝐹𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 1) = 𝐹�𝚽𝑖,𝑡−1Domestic𝚩C + 𝚽𝑡−1Global𝚩G� ,     (4) 
 
where CFMit is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if country i changes its CFM (increases 
controls on capital inflows, decreases controls on capital outflows, or increases macroprudential 
measures) during week t; 𝚽𝑡−1Global is a vector of global variables (common shocks) lagged by one week 
(the VIX, TED spread, commodity prices, and the interest-rate spread); 𝚽𝑖,𝑡−1Domestic is a vector of variables 
measuring domestic country characteristics. Domestic country characteristics include changes in key 
macroeconomic variables (the exchange rate, capital flows, inflation expectations, private credit, and 
reserves) and level variables measuring country characteristics which change less frequently (the 
exchange rate regime, capital account openness, financial market development, income per capita, and 
institutional strength). It is worth noting that these controls include variables capturing changes in policies 
other than CFMs that countries could select during this era of strong capital inflows, such as changes in 
exchange rates, interest rates, and reserve accumulation (i.e., other aspects of the trilemma). The 
regression is estimated using a logit model with robust standard errors.19
 
  
The resulting estimates of equation 4 for our sample of 60 countries are reported in Table 3. Many of the 
variables expected to affect the probability that a country modifies a CFM are significant and have the 
expected sign, although the covariates play differing roles for the three types of CFMs. Focusing on 
variables that are significant at the 5% level, countries are significantly more likely to increase inflow 
controls and decrease outflow controls if they have had greater real exchange rate appreciation. Countries 
                                                          
17 The six-month exclusion window around a change in a CFM (three months before and after the treatment date) as 
well as the one-period lag of all explanatory variables should reduce the likelihood that the explanatory variables are 
influenced by the introduction or anticipation of the CFMs. Forbes et al. (2012) find no evidence that markets 
reacted in advance to recent changes in Brazil’s tax on capital inflows. 
18 We have also controlled for other variables—such as changes in equity indices, CPI inflation, the money supply 
(M1), and expected GDP growth. None of these variables is significant in any of the specifications and including 
them does not alter any of the main results. We have also used other measures for key variables—such as the 
nominal exchange rate instead of real exchange rate and the spread on overnight interest rates (instead of three-
month Treasuries). These changes also do not affect the key results, so we focus on measures that maximize the 
sample size. 
19 We focus on a logit instead of probit model in order to “spread out” the density of scores at very low and high 
propensity scores. 
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are significantly more likely to increase macroprudential measures if they have had higher inflation 
expectations, greater private credit growth, a floating exchange rate, and more open capital account. 
Countries are significantly more likely to remove outflow controls if they have a higher income level, 
larger financial market, and less open capital account (likely capturing that countries with an open capital 
account have more limited ability to remove outflow controls). Countries with stronger legal compliance 
are significantly more likely to use macroprudential measures and remove controls on capital outflows—
with both of these effects nonlinear and decreasing at higher levels of compliance.  
 
It is worth highlighting two key points related to the results in Table 3. First, the estimates confirm that 
selection bias (with respect to relatively time invariant country characteristics as well as time-varying 
values of outcome variables and other policy choices) needs to be considered in an analysis of the effects 
of CFMs. Countries which use capital controls and macroprudential measures are different than countries 
which do not use these measures (based on variables such as openness, institutions, and exchange rate 
regimes). Variables that are intended to be influenced by capital controls and macroprudential measures 
(such as exchange rates and credit growth) often behave differently before adjustments in these CFMs. 
Second, the adjusted-R2’s reported at the bottom of the table indicate that the equations have a moderate 
degree of explanatory power—but much of the variation in countries’ decisions to use CFMs is not 
captured in the model. This is not a concern in propensity-score matching, however, and a perfect fit for 
the first-stage logit regression would instead be problematic. The goal of this logit model is to obtain a 
distribution of propensity scores in order to match treated and control observations. If the model perfectly 
explained countries’ choices to adjust CFMs, then there would be no overlap between the propensity 
scores of the countries which did and did not make the policy changes, and therefore propensity-score 
matching would be unsuccessful. 
 
We have also estimated several different variants of these regressions in order to assess any impact on the 
key results. First, we use a one-month (instead of three-month) exclusion window before and after a 
change in a CFM during which an observation cannot be used as a control group. This reduces the 
explanatory power of the regressions as expected (because countries which recently changed policies are 
now included as controls), but does not otherwise change the main results. Second, we repeat the base-
case estimates using a cloglog specification to adjust for the fact that the distribution of the LHS variable 
is not normal. This has no significant effect on the results. Third, we try different combinations of the 
explanatory variables. For example, we avoid repetition of variables that are highly correlated (such as the 
TED and VIX). We also estimate each of these regressions using a stepwise regression that only includes 
variables which are significant at the 20% level (or less) in the first stage. These changes cause several 
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variables that were not significant in the full specification to become significant with the more limited set 
of controls.20
 
 These changes, however, do not significantly affect any of the key results and will be 
discussed in the sensitivity analysis in Section 4.3. These more parsimonious first-stage regressions also 
reduce the accuracy of the matching discussed below, so for our base case, we utilize the larger set of 
explanatory variables that are consistent across equations for the first-stage regressions.  
3.3 Matching the Treatment and Control Groups 
We next use the estimates in Table 3 to calculate propensity scores for each of the 60 countries in the 
sample for each week from 2009 through 2011. Then we use these propensity scores to create a control 
group for each treated observation (each change in a CFM) based on five matching algorithms: nearest-
neighbor without replacement, five-nearest neighbors with replacement, radius with caliper, kernel, and 
local-linear matching.21
 
 These algorithms differ based on how many observations they include in the 
control set and how they weight each of these control observations. Each matching algorithm has 
advantages and disadvantages. Appendix C provides more information on these different techniques. In 
the following analysis, we begin with each of the five matching algorithms and then use different tests to 
evaluate their performance and select the base case(s) for the analysis. This evaluation of the different 
matching techniques is critical in order to ensure that they satisfy criteria required for propensity-score 
matching to be valid. This use of multiple matching algorithms is also useful to test the robustness of key 
results, as certain results can be sensitive to the creation of the control group.  
Before performing these tests, however, it is useful to consider the nearest-neighbor matches for several 
major treatment events to form an intuitive understanding of how countries are matched. For example, in 
a highly publicized example of a change in a CFM, Brazil increased its tax on bond inflows from 4% to 
6% on October 19, 2010. This treatment is matched with Mexico in 2010 (week 20).  South Africa is a 
country which has been actively reducing controls on capital outflows. Its first major liberalization in the 
sample was in February 2009, which is matched with Malaysia (2009, week 21) and its last major 
liberalization in the sample was in December 2011, which is also matched with Malaysia (2011, week 
50).  A number of diverse countries increased their macroprudential measures, such as: Brazil (2010, 
week 42) which is matched with the Philippines (2010, week 42); Peru (2011, week 1) which is matched 
                                                          
20 More specifically, in the stepwise model predicting increased controls on capital inflows, the coefficients on 
portfolio flows, CPI expectations, financial market size, and institutional strength become significant at the 5% level 
(with the same signs). In the corresponding regressions predicting decreased controls on capital outflows, the 
coefficient on commodity prices becomes significant at the 5% level, and in regressions predicting increased 
macroprudential measures, the coefficient on the VIX becomes significant. 
21 See Heinrich, Maffioli, and Vázquez (2010) for an excellent discussion of the different matching methodologies 
and tests to ascertain if the approach is valid. 
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with Argentina (2010, week 49); Indonesia (2011, week 4) which is matched with Turkey (2011, week 
31); Korea (2010, week 1) which is matched with New Zealand (2010, week 3); and the Czech Republic 
(2009, week 44) which is matched with Poland (2009, week 31). These examples suggest that the nearest 
neighbors generally make intuitive sense in terms of the control observation sharing similar country 
characteristics with the treated country and occurring around the same time as the treatment event. This 
matching across time is facilitated by the series of controls for global variables, the “global financial 
cycle” in the first-stage regressions, and the substantial volatility in many of these measures over the 
sample period.22
 
  
In addition to these intuitive checks of nearest-neighbor matches, it is also necessary to perform more 
formal tests to assess if propensity-score matching is valid. The end of Appendix C discusses a number of 
statistics that can be analyzed to assess the bias/efficiency tradeoff. Two formal tests, however, must be 
satisfied: the Common Support Condition (also known as the “Overlap Test”) and Balancing Test (also 
known as the “Independence Assumption”).  
 
The Common Support Condition requires that for each set of observable characteristics in Xi, there is a 
positive probability that a country-week observation is treated and untreated (i.e., that 0 < p(Xi) < 1). 
Countries are “on-support” if they meet this condition. The last row for each CFM in Table A1 reports the 
number of countries that are on-support using each matching algorithm. All treated observations are on-
support for the nearest-neighbor, five-nearest neighbors, and local-linear matching algorithms for each of 
the three CFMs. The algorithm which is the least accurate in terms of yielding more “off-support” 
observations is the radius methodology.  The radius method generates 3 countries (out of 21) that are off-
support for increased inflow controls, 1 that is off-support (out of 59) for increased macroprudential 
measures, and 2 (out of 29) for decreased outflow controls.23
 
 The kernel algorithm has one treated 
observation that is off-support (for increased inflow controls). In the analysis that follows, we only 
include observations that meet this common-support condition. We also drop all observations with a 
propensity score higher than the maximum or lower than the minimum propensity score of the controls in 
order to reduce the effect of any “bad” matches. The literature suggests that this can be important, 
especially for radius, kernel, and local-linear matching.  
                                                          
22 For a discussion of the importance of this global financial cycle in explaining capital flows and capital flow 
volatility, see Rey (2014) and Forbes and Warnock (2012). 
23 Observations that are off-support using the radius method are: Brazil (2009, week 47), Vietnam (2011, week 34 
and 2011, week 33) for inflow controls; Ukraine (2009, week 16) for macroprudential regulations; and South Africa 
(2010, week 7 and 2011, week 4) for outflow controls. The observation that is off-support using the kernel method is 
Vietnam (2011, week 33) for inflow controls. 
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The other key test to assess if a matching methodology is valid is the Balancing Test or “Independence 
Assumption”. The goal of this test is to verify that the matching was able to remove any significant 
differences between the treated and control groups that existed in the unmatched samples, i.e., that: 
 
D  ┴   X |  p(X).         (5) 
 
Table 4 reports results of this test for increased controls on capital inflows. It begins by showing mean 
values for the treated group (μT) and control group (μC) for the unmatched sample for each of the variables 
in the vector X used to estimate propensity scores. The table also reports t-statistics for tests of the 
hypothesis that the mean of each variable in the treated group is equal to the mean in the control group 
(H0: μT = μC). There are significant differences between the treated and the unmatched control group for 
seven variables. Countries were significantly more likely to increase their controls on capital inflows if 
they had greater real exchange rate appreciation, higher expected inflation, less open capital accounts, less 
developed financial markets, lower income per capita, and lower levels of legal compliance (including the 
level and squared terms). These significant differences across the treated and unmatched control groups 
highlight that selection bias is important; countries which chose to increase their controls on capital 
inflows had significantly different characteristics than countries which did not adjust their controls.  
 
The right side of Table 4, however, indicates that each of the matching algorithms except the kernel 
methodology is able to remove this selection bias. The columns show mean values for each of the 
variables in X in the matched control groups using all five matching algorithms.  It also reports the same t-
statistics of tests for significant differences between the treated and matched control groups for each of 
the variables. In each of these tests, there are no longer significant differences between the treated and 
control groups for the nearest-neighbor, five-nearest neighbor, radius, and local-linear matching 
algorithms. Each of these four algorithms has successfully removed the significant differences across 
groups as measured by the variables in the vector X.  In contrast, after using the kernel algorithm, there 
are still significant differences between the treated and matched control groups based on five variables. 
 
Results of this balancing test are similar for increases in macroprudential measures and decreases in 
controls on capital outflows. In each case, there are significant differences in the means of several 
variables between the treated and unmatched control groups, but after using each of the matching 
algorithms except the kernel methodology, there are no longer any significant differences. For example, 
in the model predicting increases in macroprudential measures, there are significant differences between 
the treated and unmatched control group for nine variables: credit growth, expected inflation, the VIX, 
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commodity prices, the exchange rate dummy, GDP per capita, financial market size, legal compliance, 
and legal compliance squared. After using all four matching methodologies except the kernel algorithm, 
there are no longer any significant differences between the treated and matched control groups. After 
using the kernel algorithm, there are still significant differences between the treated and matched control 
groups according to one variable in X at the 5% significance level and five variables at the 10% 
significance level. Therefore, all matching algorithms successfully meet the key test for balancing except 
for the kernel technique. 
 
Based on this series of statistics and tests, and in order to simplify the discussion that follows and keep 
the number of reported results manageable, we will focus on results obtained using the local-linear 
matching algorithm as the “base case” and also show key results using five-nearest neighbors. We do not 
focus on kernel matching as it does not remove all significant differences between the treated and 
matched control groups. We do not focus on radius matching as it yields the greatest number of 
observations that are off-support. Of the three remaining methodologies, local-linear has the advantage of 
producing a mean propensity score for the matched sample that is the closest to that for the treated group 
for changes in controls on inflows and outflows. Local-linear matching also has the theoretical advantage 
that it uses all available information. Five-nearest neighbor matching also performs well, especially in 
terms of yielding low mean absolute bias (as shown in Table A1). For each significant result, however, 
we will discuss whether the finding is robust to all of the matching algorithms. 
 
 
4. Impact of Capital Controls and Macroprudential Measures 
In order to test for the impact of changes in capital controls and macroprudential measures, we compare 
outcome variables for when countries used these policies (the treated observations) with their matched 
control groups, using the matching algorithms developed in the last section. We focus on outcome 
variables that are frequently cited as reasons for adjusting CFMs: the exchange rate, portfolio flows, other 
macroeconomic variables (interest rate differentials, equity markets, and inflation), financial market 
volatility (in the exchange rate, portfolio flows, and interest rates) and other financial fragilities (bank 
leverage, private credit growth, bank credit growth, inflation expectations, and exposure to short-term 
debt, portfolio liabilities, and foreign-currency liabilities).24
 
  
                                                          
24 In most cases, we estimate how changes in CFMs affect the growth rate of these outcome variables. In several 
cases (such as for the effect on interest-rate differentials), we estimate the effect on the change in the outcome 
variable. The text and figures indicate how each outcome variable is measured. 
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To test for any significant effect of CFMs on these variables, we calculate the average treatment effect on 
the treated (ATT) for each CFM on each outcome variable. The ATT is calculated by comparing the 
average value of the outcome variable for treated observations with the average value for the respective 
matched control observations. For our base case using local-linear matching, the average is calculated 
using higher weights for control observations closer to the treated observation, based on the assigned 
weights resulting from the nonparametric estimation. Since the propensity scores are estimated, it is 
necessary to bootstrap the standard errors for the ATT in order to evaluate if there is a significant 
difference between the treated and control groups.25
 
  
We test for effects on outcome variables at any week over the six-month window after the treatment in 
order to capture any immediate as well as lagged effects of CFMs. We do not focus on longer-term effects 
as the matching algorithms (which incorporate changes in the global environment) are less accurate over 
longer time periods. In order to estimate effects over this 6-month window, we calculate a cumulative 
ATT for each of the 26 weeks after the policy change. For example, to estimate the ATT of increased 
controls on capital inflows on the nominal exchange rate, we calculate the average percent change in the 
exchange rate for the treated and control groups. For the first treatment period, this would be the change 
from period 0 (the treatment date when the controls were increased) to period 1 (1 week later). For the 
second post-treatment period, this would be the percent change from period 0 to period 2 (2 weeks). For 
the twentieth period, this would be the percent change from period 0 to period 20 (20 weeks). One benefit 
of this approach is that it allows us to capture any effects of CFMs over different time periods, rather than 
choosing, a priori, the time period on which to focus. One disadvantage of this approach is that it does 
not incorporate any adjustment for post-treatment covariates. Finally, we also winsorize all outcome 
variables at the 1% level in order to avoid having results driven by extreme outliers. 
 
4.1 Results: Base Case  
The most straightforward way to characterize the effects of CFMs over the different weekly windows 
over 6 months is graphs of the ATTs for each type of CFM and outcome variable. Figure 2 presents 
results for key variables targeted by capital controls and macroprudential measures—the exchange rate 
(nominal and real) and net portfolio inflows. Figure 2a uses local-linear matching and Figure 2b uses five-
nearest neighbors. Each bar shows the magnitude of the estimated ATT for the accumulated time in 
weeks since the change in the CFM occurred (the treatment). Dark black shading in a bar indicates that 
the ATT for that week is significant at the 5% level, and medium-blue shading indicates significance at 
the 10% level. The black line is the fitted line for the average treatment effect.  
                                                          
25 See Lechner (2002) for the appropriate methodology. We use 100 repetitions for the bootstrap. 
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The top two graphs in Figures 2a and 2b show that increased controls on capital inflows have no 
consistently significant effects on the real or nominal exchange rates relative to that for the control 
groups. The results based on local-linear matching (in Figure 2a) indicate that increasing controls on 
inflows may lead to a small real deprecation of less than 0.5% over the first two months, increasing 
gradually to reach a maximum real deprecation of 2% at about five months. This effect, however, is only 
significant at the 5% level for three weeks in the six-month window. Moreover, the results based on five-
nearest neighbor matching in Figure 2b indicate that any effect on the nominal or real exchange rate is 
insignificant and small (peaking at a 1.5% real depreciation). These effects—even if they were 
significant—are very small relative to the normal volatility in exchange rates. Other matching methods 
also yield no consistent estimates.26
 
 These results suggest that increased controls on capital inflows do not 
have a significant or economically important effect on a country’s exchange rate. 
The second rows in Figures 2a and 2b show the ATT from reducing controls on capital outflows. In this 
case, the effect is estimated to always be negative (a depreciation), and the magnitude is slightly larger. 
More specifically, removing controls on capital outflows causes a depreciation of the nominal and real 
exchange rate (relative to the counterfactual) which grows over time and peaks at about 2% after four 
months. This effect is more often significant—in the majority of weeks using local-linear matching and at 
the 10% level for over a month using five-nearest neighbor matching. Results based on radius matching 
are very similar to those based on local-linear matching (with slightly larger estimated effects). The 
bottom rows of Figures 2a and 2b show the impact of increased macroprudential measures. The estimated 
effects are even smaller and generally insignificant; even the direction of any effects on the nominal 
exchange rate varies based on the matching method. The impact of increased macroprudential measures 
on the real exchange rate appears to be negative (albeit usually insignificant)—which is in contrast to the 
OLS results which did not correct for selection bias and generally found a positive effect of 
macroprudential regulations on the real exchange rate (as discussed in Section 3.1).  
 
The graphs in the right column of Figures 2a and 2b show the effects of different CFMs on net portfolio 
inflows.27
                                                          
26 For example, nearest-neighbor matching indicates that increased inflow controls cause a small appreciation of the 
nominal and real exchange rates, while radius matching indicates a small depreciation, with estimated effects 
insignificant in most weeks. 
 They indicate that increased controls on capital inflows cause net portfolio inflows to decline 
over time, with the effect gradually increasing to a maximum 3% decline in net inflows (relative to the 
27 Net portfolio inflows are calculated as cumulative flows over the last quarter (13 weeks) and expressed as a 
percent of lagged total portfolio assets. Results are similar if portfolio inflows are not expressed as a percent of 
portfolio assets. 
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counterfactual) after about 5 months based on local-linear matching. This effect is significant at the 5% 
level for several weeks, but smaller and always insignificant (at the 5% level) based on five-nearest 
neighbor and radius matching (and in most weeks based on the other techniques). Decreased controls on 
capital outflows and increased macroprudential measures also generate declines in net capital inflows 
over time, but these effects are even smaller in magnitude and insignificant in every week with any of the 
five matching algorithms.  
 
Next, Figure 3 graphs the ATT for macroeconomic variables that are also mentioned as targets for CFMs, 
albeit usually of secondary importance relative to exchange rates and portfolio flows. We estimate the 
effects on countries’ interest-rate differentials versus the United States (using rates on 3-month Treasury 
bills), equity indices, and CPI inflation (not shown). We report results using local-linear matching (and 
results using five-nearest neighbor matching are similar). Increasing controls on capital inflows does not 
have a significant effect on any of the macroeconomic variables in any week. Decreasing controls on 
capital outflows and increasing macroprudential measures may reduce a country’s interest rate differential 
relative to the United States, but the effect is small and only significant for less than four weeks 
(including using other matching algorithms). The effect of changes in capital controls and 
macroprudential measures on equity indices and inflation are insignificant at the 5% level in every week, 
and usually even at the 10% level. Therefore, there is little evidence that any of the CFMs can 
significantly affect equity returns or inflation. Reduced controls on outflows and increased prudential 
measures may have small effects on interest-rate differentials, but only for a short period. 
 
We have also evaluated the effect of CFMs on the volatility of key variables. Volatility is measured as the 
standard deviation over the previous 26 weeks and we estimate the volatility in the nominal exchange 
rate, net portfolio inflows, and interest-rate differentials (based on overnight rates), all defined in 
Appendix B. Increased controls on inflows are more likely to reduce volatility, and decreased controls on 
outflows are more likely to increase volatility. Macroprudential measures are estimated to decrease 
exchange rate volatility, but increase capital flow volatility—a result which is shown in the right-hand 
column of Figure 3. Once again, however, all of these estimated effects are insignificant or short-lived—
except for the positive effect of increased macroprudential measures on portfolio-flow volatility after 3 
months (which is consistently significant across matching methodologies). Therefore, there is little 
evidence that adjusting capital controls or increasing macroprudential measures can significantly reduce 
the volatility of key financial variables, and increasing macroprudential measures may instead increase 
the volatility in portfolio flows. 
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Finally, one goal of capital controls, and especially macroprudential measures, which has recently 
received more attention is to reduce financial vulnerability. Data measuring financial vulnerabilities for 
our diverse sample is limited, so we focus on several available measures that capture different forms of 
potential vulnerability and that are frequently included in early-warning models: the growth in private 
credit (relative to GDP), the growth in bank credit (relative to GDP), inflation expectations, bank leverage 
(measured as bank credit to deposits), and exposure to short-term external debt (relative to GDP), 
portfolio liabilities (as a share of total liabilities), and foreign-currency liabilities (as a share of total 
liabilities). Since these outcome variables are reported at a lower frequency than the variables analyzed 
above, we estimate ATTs for the corresponding time period available for each outcome variable (as 
specified in Appendix B) for a longer window of 52 weeks. For example, information on the growth in 
private credit is available on a monthly basis, so we estimate cumulative ATTs for each month over a 
year, and data on bank leverage is only available at an annual basis, so we estimate the ATT for one year 
only.  
 
To simplify the discussion of this large number of results, Figure 4 shows all results when increased 
inflow controls, decreased outflow controls, or increased macroprudential measures have a significant 
effect (at the 5% level) on a measure of financial vulnerability for both local-linear and five-nearest 
neighbor matching for at least a week. Increased macroprudential measures significantly reduce expected 
inflation, reduce bank leverage28
 
, reduce bank credit growth, and initially reduce the portfolio share of 
liabilities (although this final effect reverses after a year). Increased controls on capital inflows 
significantly reduce private credit growth (although this affect fades and becomes insignificant after 34 
weeks). Moreover, the magnitude of some of these effects can be economically important. For example, 
an increase in macroprudential regulations is correlated with a decline in expected inflation of about 0.4% 
after six months relative to the counterfactual. This series of results indicates that CFMs appear to be most 
effective in reducing different measures of financial vulnerability. Macroprudential measures appear to be 
especially potent as they show evidence of being able to significantly reduce inflation expectations, bank 
leverage, bank credit growth, and exposure to portfolio liabilities in the short term. 
4.2 Results: More Narrowly Defined CFMs 
The measures of capital controls and macroprudential measures used in the previous section are defined 
broadly and encompass very different types of policies that may have different goals. Different types of 
capital controls and macroprudential measures may be more effective at targeting certain variables. 
Therefore, this section repeats the main analysis using narrower definitions of capital controls and 
                                                          
28 Data on bank leverage is extremely limited, however, so these results should be interpreted with caution. 
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macroprudential measures. More specifically, we test for effects of capital controls on equities or bonds, 
of “major” controls (that received more attention by financial analysts), and of macroprudential 
regulations directed at banks’ international exposure or foreign exchange.  
 
To begin, we more narrowly classify the capital controls in our database as targeting bond flows, equity 
flows, and/or FDI (with some events targeting more than one type of flow). Of the 63 events that involve 
increased inflow controls or decreased outflow controls, more events target bonds (45 events) and equities 
(33 events) compared to FDI (only 13 events). Then we estimate the effect of changes in controls 
targeting bonds or targeting equities on exchange rates (nominal and real), net portfolio inflows, net bond 
inflows, and net equity inflows. There are no consistently significant effects on real or nominal exchange 
rates, net portfolio inflows, or net bond inflows from changes in equity or bond controls. The only result 
that is significant is that lifting controls on equity and/or bond flows can lead to a significant reduction in 
net equity inflows.29 This may indicate that controls on capital inflows are more effective at reducing 
equity than bond flows, but it is impossible to draw strong conclusions for two reasons. First, there is 
substantial overlap in the events when countries change controls on equities and bonds, making it 
impossible to isolate the effect of changes in just one type of control that does not occur simultaneously 
with the other.30 Second, the data on bond flows is less comprehensive than the data on equity flows, 
which makes comparing estimates for the different types of flows imprecise.31
 
 
Next, we more narrowly define the capital controls and macroprudential measures in our database as 
CFMs that were “major” in the sense that they received more discussion or attention by investors, 
financial analysts, or international financial institutions. CFMs that receive more widespread attention 
may have greater effects if CFMs work at least partially through a signaling effect (as suggested in Forbes 
et al., 2012)—although it is also possible that larger changes in CFMs generate more attention and 
therefore have a larger effect due to the size of the change rather than the signal. Since our database is not 
                                                          
29 This result is consistent with Forbes et al. (2012), which finds that changes in Brazil’s taxes on bond inflows 
generated a significant reduction in equity allocations to Brazil. This result is also consistent with a key argument in 
Bartolini and Drazen (1997), which models how changes in capital controls can affect capital flows not directly 
affected by the policy change when investors have imperfect information. Although Bartolini and Drazen (1997) 
focuses on an example in which the signal from removing controls on capital outflows leads to a larger net capital 
inflow and currency appreciation (which is the opposite effect found in this paper), the relevant insight for our 
analysis is that a change in policy can be interpreted as providing a signal about future government policy toward 
capital mobility in general. 
30 There are several events in which there are changes in controls on bond flows that do not occur simultaneously 
with changes in controls on equity flows, but the sample size is too small to use propensity-score matching with any 
degree of confidence. There are very few events in which there are changes in controls on equity flows that do not 
occur simultaneously with changes in controls on bond flows. 
31 See Forbes et al. (2012) for information on coverage in the EPFR database on equity and bond flows. 
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able to capture the magnitude or intensity of different types of CFMs, this extension can also be loosely 
interpreted as an assessment if larger changes in CFMs had different effects than in the full sample.  
 
To create this definition of major controls, we review a broad sample of analyst reports written from 
2009-2012 on CFMs, as well as papers written by the IMF and think tanks that surveyed recent changes 
in CFMs over this time period.32
 
 Any CFM event that is mentioned in at least one of these sources is then 
defined as a major event. Only 39 events in the full database of 135 CFMs aimed at reducing inflow 
pressures are identified as major events, confirming that many of the changes in CFMs may have been 
fairly minor changes or occurred in smaller countries that did not receive substantial attention by 
investors.  
Then we repeat the base-case estimation, but only include these major CFM events. Most of the estimated 
ATTs are similar to the key results reported above for the larger sample. The only noteworthy exceptions 
are reported in Figure 5. The top row shows the effects of major increases in inflow controls and the 
second row shows the effects of major decreases in outflow controls. These major changes in capital 
controls have larger and consistently significant negative effects on net portfolio inflows than found for 
the larger sample, but mixed robustness across matching methods. The middle column also indicates that 
the reduction in net portfolio flows from major changes in controls may come at a cost. Major changes 
generate increased volatility in capital inflows—and this effect is significant, robust, and much larger for 
increased inflow controls. It is also worth noting that removing major outflow controls causes a 
significant deprecation of the real exchange rate for several weeks, but major increases in inflow controls 
does not have a similar effect. This supports the prior evidence from the larger sample of events that 
removing controls on capital outflows is more likely to cause a depreciation of the real exchange rate 
(relative to the counterfactual) than increasing controls on inflows.  
 
As a final extension of the base analysis, we classify the changes in macroprudential measures in our 
database as measures targeting banks’ international exposures and those targeting foreign exchange 
exposures. This classification shows that of the 72 increases in macroprudential measures in the sample, 
57 were aimed directly at banks and 63 aimed directly at foreign exchange exposures. There are a 
substantial number of measures which simultaneously involve restrictions in multiple areas, such as limits 
on the foreign exchange exposure of banks, which makes it impossible to isolate the effects of just one 
                                                          
32 We use analyst reports written by Goldman Sachs, HSBC, JPMorgan, and Morgan Stanley. We also review 
regular reports on capital flows written by the Institute of International Finance, Peterson Institute for International 
Economics, and a series of reports on CFMs written by the IMF. 
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type of change in these macroprudential regulations. With this caveat, we test if these narrower types of 
macroprudential measures have different effects on key outcome variables than found for the broader 
sample of treatments. The key results reported above generally do not change significantly. The only 
noteworthy differences are that increased regulations targeting banks tend to more often have significant 
negative effects on private credit growth and exposure to short-term debt than regulations targeting 
foreign exchange—although robustness varies across matching methodologies.  
 
4.3 Results: Additional Sensitivity Tests 
In addition to the robustness tests reported above, we also perform a series of sensitivity tests to assess if 
the key results are driven by the specification of the first-stage regressions used to calculate the propensity 
scores, the definition of the exclusion window, or any key countries which make frequent changes to their 
CFMs. First, we test if different specifications for the first-stage logit model used to calculate propensity 
scores affect key results. We have included additional variables in the model (such as the current account 
balance relative to GDP, budget balance relative to GDP, and debt to GDP); these additional variables are 
never significant and do not affect key results (except including debt ratios shrinks the sample size due to 
limited data availability). We have also estimated more parsimonious specifications for the first-stage 
regressions. For example, given the large number of insignificant and multicollinear variables in the first 
stage, we use a stepped regression and only include variables which are significant at the 20% level in the 
logit regressions reported in Table 3. As expected, this causes the variables remaining in the regression to 
more often be significant. The main results on the effects of changes in CFMs on key outcome variables, 
however, are not only unchanged, but basically identical to the results discussed above. This confirms that 
the key results do not appear to be highly sensitivity to modifications in the first-stage regressions used to 
calculate propensity scores. This also confirms one of the important advantages of propensity-score 
matching over OLS in terms of its flexibility to the inclusion of large numbers of observable variables in 
the first-stage model. 
 
Second, we test for any impact of adjusting the length of the exclusion window—the length of time before 
and after a country changes a CFM during which it is not included as a treated or control observation. In 
our base case, we define the exclusion window to last for three months. We also repeat the main analysis 
using a shorter exclusion window of one month. As expected, this increases the sample size but also 
decreases the adjusted-R2 for the first-stage logit regressions.33
                                                          
33 For example, in the first-stage logit regression predicting increased controls on capital inflows, the sample size 
increases to 5167 (from 4953 in the base case) and the adjusted-R2 falls to 0.170 (from 0.192 in the base case). 
 The main results on the effects of changes 
in CFMs on key outcome variables, however, are unchanged. The only noteworthy change is that the 
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effect of removing controls on capital outflows on the real exchange rate is weaker under several 
matching algorithms than in the base case. We have also attempted to repeat the analysis using a longer 
exclusion window of six months, but this significantly reduces the sample size of treated observations and 
makes the propensity score matching less effective. 
 
Finally, there are several countries in the sample which make frequent changes to their capital controls 
and macroprudential measures, and could therefore be driving key results. Countries which frequently 
change their CFMs may also have different effects on key outcome variables. Changes could have a 
greater effect because the country already has enforcement mechanisms in place to ensure the new rules 
are applied. Or changes could have a smaller effect because investors expect frequent changes and are 
less surprised and likely to adjust their behavior in response to these changes. Table 1 shows that Peru 
stands out as increasing macroprudential measures most often (with 14 changes), Brazil for increasing 
controls on capital inflows (7 changes), and South Africa for decreasing controls on capital outflows (8 
changes). To see if these countries which more often adjusted their CFMs affect the key results, we repeat 
the main estimation as in the base case, but exclude these three countries from the relevant sample.   
 
The key results discussed above are unchanged, with two exceptions.  First, when Brazil’s increases in 
inflow controls are excluded from the sample, this reduces any estimated effects of controls on net capital 
inflows (which were only significant for selected weeks and certain matching methods in the base case). 
This also renders the effect of controls on equity inflows (discussed in Section 4.2) insignificant for every 
single week. Therefore, Brazil’s use of capital controls appears to have had stronger effects on capital 
flows—and especially equity flows—than for the other countries in the sample.34
 
 Second, when South 
Africa’s reductions in outflow controls are excluded from the sample, the effect of outflow controls on the 
real exchange rate is larger and more often significant, and the effect on the nominal exchange rate is now 
significant. Therefore, removing controls on capital outflows appears to have a stronger effect on the 
exchange rate for most countries than occurred for South Africa.  
4.4 Results: Tying it All Together 
The results in this section indicate that CFMs can have significant effects on some of the variables which 
they are intended to influence, but in most cases the effects are insignificant, short-lived, small in 
magnitude, and not robust across different matching methodologies. The strongest effects of CFMs 
                                                          
34 Forbes et al. (2012) provide a discussion of why this could occur; Brazil’s adjustments to controls on capital 
inflows from 2008 through 2011 were the most high-profile examples of the newly popular approach to the use of 
CFMs. This is also an emerging market with a large market capitalization and that was fairly open to foreign 
investment, therefore potentially generating a stronger reaction by investors than would occur in other markets. 
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appear to be in reducing certain measures of financial vulnerability. Increases in macroprudential 
measures related to international transactions significantly reduce bank leverage, inflation expectations, 
and bank credit growth over the following year. Increases in these macroprudential regulations reduce 
exposure to portfolio liabilities over a quarter and increases in controls on capital inflows reduce private 
credit growth over about eight months—although these last two effects reverse by the end of a year.  
 
In contrast to these robust results showing that CFMs can reduce financial fragilities, there is little 
consistent evidence that they can affect two other primary goals: exchange rate appreciation and net 
capital inflows. Removing controls on capital outflows causes a depreciation of the real exchange rate 
which peaks at just over 2% after about four months. This result is significant for more weeks and 
stronger across different matching methodologies when South Africa’s frequent changes in outflow 
controls are dropped from the sample. Increased capital inflow controls and macroprudential measures 
have even smaller and generally insignificant effects on exchange rates (nominal and real) and capital 
flows. “Major” changes in capital controls (and especially Brazil’s adjustments to inflow controls) which 
received more attention from investors have stronger effects on portfolio inflows, although major 
increases in inflow controls also cause a significant increase in capital flow volatility and translate into 
little consistent, significant, or economically meaningful impact on the real exchange rate. 
 
Finally, the results show little evidence that changes in CFMs affect other macroeconomic and financial 
market variables over the short- and medium-term. Increased inflow controls and decreased outflow 
controls have no significant effect on equity indices, inflation, interest-rate differentials versus the United 
States, or the volatility of exchange rates, portfolio flows, or interest-rate differentials. Increased 
macroprudential regulations related to international exposures also generally have no consistently 
significant effect on any of these variables, except that they can reduce interest-rate differentials for short 
periods of time by a small amount and may actually increase—instead of decrease— portfolio flow 
volatility.  Any indirect effects of CFMs on these macroeconomic and volatility measures due to any 
benefits from reduced financial vulnerability, however, would not be captured if they occurred over 
longer time periods than measured in this analysis.  
 
 
5. Conclusions 
An extensive literature has attempted to assess the impact of capital controls and, to a lesser extent, 
macroprudential measures. Challenges for this literature include selection bias and data availability. 
Countries which change their capital controls and macroprudential measures are different than countries 
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which do not. Countries adjust these policies in response to changes in key macroeconomic variables, 
variables which are often the targets of the controls and macroprudential measures.  This paper shows that 
these challenges are not just hypothetical and should be considered when estimating the effect of CFMs. 
In order to do so, it uses a propensity-score methodology. This technique uses several matching 
algorithms to create control groups establishing the counterfactual for key outcome variables in the 
absence of changes in CFMs. This is the first attempt (to the best of our knowledge) to use this 
methodology to analyze the impact of capital controls and macroprudential measures.  
 
In order to perform this analysis, it is necessary to construct a new database which includes detailed 
information at a higher frequency and for a larger sample of countries on changes in capital controls and 
macroprudential measures. We only focus on the subset of macroprudential measures classified as 
“capital-flow management measures”, i.e., related to foreign exposures or foreign transactions, and do not 
include purely domestic macroprudential regulations. The dataset includes weekly information for 60 
economies from 2009 through 2011. It is unique in that it is the first dataset that captures changes in 
CFMs not only for a large set of countries, but also at a high frequency. We estimate propensity scores of 
the probability that each country adopts a specific capital control or macroprudential measure in each 
week based on a set of domestic and global variables. The analysis then uses these propensity scores to 
match each policy change (i.e., treatment) with a control group in order to create a counterfactual against 
which to assess the effect of the policy change on key outcome variables. The analysis focuses on the 
impact of CFMs aimed at reducing pressures from capital inflows and currency appreciation—increased 
controls on capital inflows, decreased controls on capital outflows, and increased macroprudential 
regulations.  
 
The results indicate that certain CFMs can accomplish specific goals—especially in terms of reducing 
financial vulnerabilities—but most CFMs are ineffective at accomplishing other stated goals. More 
specifically, macroprudential measures related to international exposures can significantly improve 
measures linked to financial fragility, such as bank leverage, inflation expectations, bank credit growth, 
and exposure to portfolio liabilities.  Increased controls on capital inflows can reduce private credit 
growth (although this effect, as well as that for portfolio liabilities, appears to fade and reverse after six 
months). CFMs, however, do not appear to have a significant effect on most other macroeconomic 
variables and financial market volatilities over the short and medium-term, including on equity indices, 
inflation, interest-rate differentials, or the volatility of exchange rates, portfolio flows, or interest-rate 
differentials. CFMs have limited effectiveness achieving two of their primary goals: reducing exchange 
rate appreciation and net capital inflows. One type of CFM—removing controls on capital outflows—can 
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yield a significant but small depreciation of the real exchange rate (with a maximum depreciation of less 
than 2.5% over four months relative to the counterfactual). “Major” changes in capital controls which 
received more attention from investors are more likely to affect portfolio inflows, although major changes 
in inflow controls can also cause a significant increase in capital flow volatility and translate into no 
consistent, significant, or economically meaningful impact on the real exchange rate. 
 
These results should be interpreted with several cautions. The analysis only captures any immediate and 
medium-term effects, and not longer-term effects that occur after six months (or in some cases, one year). 
The analysis does not capture any costs related to the policies that are not included in the set of outcome 
variables (such as costs related to financial intermediation, enforcing the regulations, reduced access to 
credit for certain groups, or distortions from attempts to evade the measures).35
 
 These costs should be 
weighed against any benefits before implementing any of these policies. Also, the estimated 
ineffectiveness of many capital-flow management measures may reflect challenges in calibrating, timing, 
communicating, and enforcing the policies. If any such shortcomings were addressed, especially as 
policymakers have more experience using these tools, it is possible that capital controls and 
macroprudential measures could be used more effectively in the future.  
Subject to these caveats, the series of results in the paper has two important implications. First, much of 
the recent policy debate on the use of CFMs to reduce exchange rate appreciation has focused on the use 
of controls on capital inflows. This paper finds little evidence that controls on capital inflows can 
accomplish this goal in a systematic manner. Instead the evidence suggests that removing controls on 
capital outflows (if present) tends to be more effective for limiting exchange rate appreciation. This 
supports the recent focus in papers such as Aizenman and Pasricha (2013) and Bayoumi and Ohnsorge 
(2013) on the importance of the liberalization of capital outflows by domestics rather than just capital 
inflows from foreigners. The analysis in this paper, however, only focuses on the removal of existing 
controls on capital outflows that have generally been in place for an extended period. Removing capital 
controls that were put into place to limit capital outflows during a severe crisis (such as in Iceland in 2008 
or Cyprus in 2013) could involve additional complexities that are not analyzed in this paper.36
 
 
Finally, the debate on capital controls (and to a lesser extent macroprudential measures) has historically 
focused on their impact on exchange rates, capital flows, and other macroeconomic variables. Only 
                                                          
35 For evidence on the costs of capital controls, see Forbes (2007a, 2007b). For evidence on the costs and potential 
spillover effects of capital controls and macroprudential policies, see Beirne and Friedrich (2013) and Jeanne (2013).  
36 For a discussion of these risks in removing Iceland’s capital controls, see Baldursson and Portes (2013). 
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recently has the debate shifted to using these policies to reduce other forms of financial vulnerability (i.e., 
Ostry et al., 2012 and He, 2013). The evidence in this paper suggests that this new focus is likely to be 
more effective. Capital controls and macroprudential measures have few significant effects on exchange 
rates, capital flows, and other macroeconomic variables over the short- and medium-term. In contrast, 
macroprudential measures related to international exposures (and to a lesser extent capital controls) 
appear to be more effective at reducing other forms of financial fragility.  
 
Although limited, this impact of CFMs can still be important.37
 
 Even if macroprudential measures can not 
directly affect prices or other key macroeconomic variables, they could stabilize economies by reducing 
financial vulnerabilities and therefore improving other macroeconomic measures over time. Policymakers 
evaluating whether to use different forms of capital controls and macroprudential measures should 
therefore be realistic about what these measures are (and are not) good for.  
  
                                                          
37 This agrees with evidence from Hong’s Kong’s use of macroprudential measures to reduce vulnerability to the 
housing sector. He (2103) discusses how the Hong Kong Monetary Authority implemented macroprudential 
measures targeting the property market. These measures did not significantly reduce property-price growth or 
property transactions, but did reduce financial fragilities related to exposure to the housing sector—such as banking 
and household leverage related to housing. This made the economy more resilient during the Global Financial 
Crisis. 
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Appendix A 
Information on Capital-Flow Management Data Set 
The primary source of information for this dataset is the Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions by the International Monetary Fund for the years 2010−2012. We focus on the end 
of the section on each country which reports any changes in capital-flow management policies which 
occurred over the past year. We supplement this source with information from reports by Goldman Sachs, 
HSBC, Institute of International Finance, JP Morgan Chase, and Morgan Stanley that include information 
on capital flow policies or country information. We also incorporate information from two papers on 
capital controls: Magud, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2011) and Reinhart, Kirkegaard, and Sbrancia (2011). 
Finally, we confirm and add several additional CFM measures using primary news sources. 
 
Examples of the types of CFMs that are included in the database and how they are classified as “capital 
controls” or “macroprudential measures” are listed in the table below. We only include changes in 
macroprudential measures if they specifically relate to foreign exchange and/or international exposure. 
 
Types of Capital Flow Management Techniques 
Capital controls Macroprudential Measures 
• Quantitative limits on foreign ownership of 
domestic companies’ assets 
• Quantitative limits on borrowing from abroad 
• Limits on ability to borrow from offshore entities 
• Restrictions on purchase of foreign assets, 
including foreign deposits 
• Special licensing on FDI and other financial 
transactions 
• Minimum stay requirements for new capital 
inflows 
• Taxes on capital inflows 
• Reserve requirements on inflows of capital (e.g. 
unremunerated reserve requirements) 
• Reporting requirements and limitations on 
maturity structure of liabilities and assets 
• Restrictions on off-balance-sheet 
activities and derivatives contracts 
• Limits on asset acquisition 
• Limits on banks’ FX positions 
• Limits on banks’ lending in FX 
• Asset classification and provisioning rules 
• Taxes on FX transactions 
• Capital requirements on FX assets 
• Differential reserve requirements on 
liabilities in local and FX currencies 
 
Measures which are NOT included as CFMs in the database are: 
• Changes in macroprudential regulations that are not related to foreign exchange or do not 
differentially affect foreigners—such as increases in reserve ratios that affect all types of 
deposits of changes in LTV ratios. 
• Limits on capital flows when targeted at specific countries and/or related to sanctions for 
political reasons (such as restrictions on transactions with Libya or Iran). 
• Transactions by the central bank or government in foreign exchange markets aimed at 
affecting the exchange rate. 
• Automatic changes in limits on foreign investment that result from pre-specified indexing to 
inflation (as occurs in Australia). 
• Regulations resulting from specific trade disputes or issues related to one specific industry 
(including specific restrictions on the oil and gas industry). 
• Changes in rules related to foreign purchases of land.  
• Minor changes affecting nonresidents living or travelling abroad or residents travelling 
abroad (such as limits on gifts to family members in different countries, payments for 
education or medical expenses abroad, or access to foreign currency for travel). 
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We use the week of the announcement date of the CFM if it is available, and if not, we use the week of 
the implementation date as listed in the AREARs. In several cases, multiple CFMs are put into place in 
the same week. In most of these cases, these measures were aimed at a similar goal and are coded as a 
single CFM event. For example, in the week of July 1, 2009, Peru enacted capital controls to stem 
appreciation pressures (a ban on foreign purchases of central bank bills) and increased macroprudential 
regulations (increased reserve requirements on certain foreign liabilities). In these cases, the week is 
coded as implementing a new CFM which is both a control on capital inflows and a macroprudential 
measure, affecting both bonds and banks. In a few cases, countries made multiple changes which may 
have partially counteracted each other. In these cases, we include the most important control in the 
database based on the government’s intentions according to statements made on the announcement date.38
 
 
We compile this data on CFMs using a broad sample of countries. We begin with all “Advanced 
Economies” (as defined by the International Monetary Fund as of October 2012) and all “Emerging 
Markets” and “Frontier Economies” (as defined by Standard & Poor’s BMI indices). We then exclude 
current members of the euro area, the three largest advanced economies (the United States, United 
Kingdom, and Japan), countries that do not have data on equity or bond flows in the EPFR dataset, and 
very small countries (with GDP less than $15 billion at the end of 2011).39
 
 This yields a sample of 60 
countries which are listed below. 
Countries in the Sample 
Argentina Egypt Lithuania Russia 
Australia Ghana Malaysia Singapore 
Bahrain Hong Kong Mexico South Africa 
Botswana Hungary Morocco Sri Lanka 
Brazil India New Zealand Sweden 
Bulgaria Indonesia Nigeria Switzerland 
Canada Israel Norway Taiwan 
Chile Jamaica Oman Thailand 
China Jordan Pakistan Trinidad & Tobago 
Colombia Kazakhstan Panama Tunisia 
Cote d’Ivoire Kenya Peru Turkey 
Croatia Korea Philippines Ukraine 
Czech Republic Kuwait Poland United Arab Emirates 
Denmark Latvia Qatar Vietnam 
Ecuador Lebanon Romania Zambia 
  
                                                          
38 For example, in October 2010 Thailand reinstated a 15% withholding tax on foreigners’ interest and capital gains 
on new Thai government bonds issued by the government or GSEs. On the same date, the ceiling on foreign 
currency deposits with local banks was raised. Since the former announcement received substantial attention, but not 
the later, the first is coded in the data as a new control on capital inflows, but the change in the macroprudential 
regulation is not included in the dataset. 
39 Countries that are excluded because they do not have data on either equity or bond flows in the EPFR dataset are: 
Bangladesh, Iceland, Iran, Mauritania, and Moldova. Countries that are excluded because they have GDP less than 
$15 billion at the end of 2011 are: Iceland, Mauritania, Mauritius, Moldova, and Namibia. 
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Appendix B: Data Definitions and Sources 
Variable Source, Original Frequency, and Other Notes 
Bank credit Private credit by deposit money banks and other 
financial institutions as a share of GDP; annual; Source: 
World Bank, Global Financial Development Database  
Bank leverage Bank credit to bank deposits; annual (only available 
through 2010); Source: World Bank, Global Financial 
Development Database  
Capital account openness Measure constructed from the International Monetary 
Fund’s AREARs data with a higher value indicating 
greater openness; annual; Source: Chinn and Ito (2008), 
updated as of 04/24/2013 and available at: 
http://web.pdx.edu/~ito/Chinn-Ito_website.htm 
Commodity price index Dow Jones AIG commodity index, closing price;  
weekly; Source: Global Financial Data 
CPI inflation Consumer price index inflation; monthly; Source: 
International Monetary Fund, International Financial 
Statistics 
CPI inflation forecasts  52-week forward consensus expectations of CPI 
inflation; monthly; Source: IPA calculations 
Equity market index 
 
Index based on a broad market measure using end-of-
week prices; weekly; Source: Datastream 
Floating exchange rate regime dummy A 0-1 dummy for a floating exchange rate, uses de facto 
exchange rate regime (classified as a peg, intermediate, 
or floating); annual; Source: Ghosh et al. (2011) 
Foreign currency liabilities as a share of total 
liabilities 
Foreign currency denominated liabilities as a share of 
total liabilities; quarterly; Source: Haver 
Foreign exchange reserves as a share of GDP  Monthly; Source: International Fund and IPA 
calculations, data for Taiwan from 
http://www.cbc.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=29908&ctNode=8
59&mp=2 
GDP per capita In nominal US$; monthly; Source: International 
Monetary Fund’s WEO database 
Interest rate differential between domestic 
and U.S. interest rates  
Based on three-month Treasury rates except for 
volatility calculations is based on overnight interest 
rates; weekly; Source: Datastream and IPA calculations  
Legal compliance index  
 
 
Index ranging from 0 (no legal compliance) to 12 (high 
legal compliance); the Legal compliance index = Sum of 
Law and Order Index, Bureaucracy Quality Index, and 
Legislative Strength Index; List of variables available at: 
http://www.prsgroup.com/VariableHelp.aspx and the  
Methodology to create this index is at: 
http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG_Methodology.aspx; 
monthly; Source: ICRG databases 
Nominal effective exchange rate  Broad index with higher values indicating an 
appreciation of the domestic currency; weekly; Source: 
Haver and JPMorgan 
Portfolio bond flows  Net portfolio bond inflows accumulated over past 13 
weeks and usually expressed as a % of bond assets at the 
start of period, in US$; weekly; Source: EPFR  
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Portfolio equity flows  Net portfolio equity inflows accumulated over past 13 
weeks and usually expressed as a % of equity assets at 
the start of period, in US$; weekly; Source: EPFR 
Portfolio flows  Sum of net portfolio bond and portfolio equity inflows; 
accumulated over past 13 weeks and usually expressed 
as a % of bond and equity assets at the start of period, in 
US$; weekly; Source: EPFR 
Portfolio liabilities as a share of total 
liabilities 
Portfolio investment liabilities in all sectors as a share of 
total liabilities (gross inflows); quarterly; Source: Haver, 
based on the International Monetary Fund’s BOP 
Private credit Expressed in local currency or as a share of GDP; 
monthly; Source: International Monetary Fund and IPA 
calculations 
Real effective exchange rate Broad real exchange rate index average for 44 countries, 
with higher values indicating an appreciation of the 
domestic currency; monthly; Source: BIS, and if not 
available, then from the International Monetary Fund; 
series is constructed for Vietnam  
Short-term external debt to GDP In millions of US$; annual; World Bank, Global 
Financial Development Database 
Stock market capitalization to GDP Annual; Source: World Bank, Global Financial 
Development Database 
TED spread Difference between the 3-month LIBOR and 3-month 
Treasury Bill yield, closing value; weekly; Source: 
Global Financial Data 
VIX  Index of market volatility calculated by the Chicago 
Board Options Exchange; measures implied volatility 
using prices for a range of options on the S&P 100 
index.; weekly; Source: Haver 
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Appendix C: Propensity-Score Methodology 
 
To use the propensity-score methodology, define a “treated” observation as Di = 1, which is any week in 
which country i changes a CFM. Likewise Di = 0 are the “untreated” or “control” observations, which are 
any weeks when country i does not change a CFM. We also create an “exclusion window” for 3 months 
before and 3 months after a change in the CFM of interest. During this exclusion window a country 
cannot be used as a control observation—even if it makes no changes to the relevant CFM during those 
weeks. Also define Y1,i as the outcome variable (such as the change in the exchange rate) for the ith 
member of the treated group and Y0,i for the ith member of the untreated (control) group.  Summing over 
members of each group, we are able to observe E[Y1,i|Di=1] and E[Y0,i|Di=0]. The variable in which we 
are interested, however, is the “average treatment effect on the treated” or ATT, which is not observable 
and is written as:  
 
ATT = E[Y1,i – Y0,i|Di=1].              (A1) 
 
The difference in the two observable statistics is a combination of the key variable of interest (the ATT) 
and sampling bias:  
 
E[Y1,i|Di=1]  –  E[Y0,i|Di=0]  =   E[Y1,i – Y0,i|Di=1]   +   E[Y0,i|Di=1] – E[Y0,i|Di=0]      (A2) 
   =        ATT       +  sampling bias . 
 
The sampling bias is the difference in outcomes that is attributable to differences in the treated and 
control group (such as different country characteristics) rather than any effect of the treatment itself.  
 
To take a simple but concrete example, consider how an increase in macroprudential regulations (the 
treatment, Di) affects the real exchange rate (Yi). Using our dataset described in Section 2, the mean 
percent change in the real exchange rate over the six months after an increase in macroprudential 
measures is 1.10% for the treated sample and 0.78% for the untreated sample. This could be interpreted as 
indicating that increasing macroprudential regulations causes an appreciation of the real exchange rate 
relative to what otherwise would have occurred (ignoring any test for significance or omitted variables). 
A closer look at the sample of treated and untreated observations, however, indicates that countries that 
increase their macroprudential regulations over the sample period are also more likely to have a floating 
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exchange rate.40
 
 More specifically, 80% of the treated group has a floating exchange rate, as compared to 
just 39% of the control group. The different patterns of exchange rate appreciation between the treatment 
and control groups may therefore result from different exchange rate regimes (selection bias) rather than 
any effect of changes in macroprudential regulations (the ATT), as specified in equation A2.  
Continuing this example, an additional calculation shows that selection bias is, in fact, overwhelming any 
ATT from increasing macroprudential regulations. We limit the sample to only include countries with 
floating exchange rates in order to remove any selection bias resulting from this variable and repeat the 
same calculations as above. The percent change in the real exchange rate over the next six months after an 
increase in macroprudential regulations is now 0.39% for the treated sample and 0.84% for the untreated 
sample. When focusing only on countries with flexible exchange rates, countries that increased their 
macroprudential regulations now appear to have less exchange rate appreciation than countries which did 
not increase regulations—reversing the earlier pattern. This is obviously not a formal test and ignores 
many other forms of selection bias and other factors that will be considered in the full analysis. But it 
does provide a simple example of how selection bias resulting from differences between the treated and 
control groups can bias estimates of policy effects.  
 
Any sampling bias between the treated and control groups would be straightforward to adjust for if 
countries differed along only one or two discrete dimensions.  If the countries could be easily apportioned 
to a small number of “cells” reflecting any differences along these dimensions, and there were enough 
treated and control cases in each cell, it would be simple to calculate the differences between the treated 
and untreated observations in each cell and take a weighted average of those differences to estimate the 
effect of different policies.  For example, as shown in the simple example above, if the only difference 
between countries which did and did not adjust macroprudential regulations was whether they had a 
floating exchange rate, it would be straightforward to divide the sample into treatment and control groups 
based on their exchange rate regime and then calculate the ATT based on differences in outcomes for 
treated and untreated countries with the same exchange rate regime. 
 
In practice, however, the differences across countries are multifaceted and numerous, and it is impossible 
to match two countries which share identical macroeconomic characteristics.  Propensity-score matching 
can address this challenge.  This methodology matches countries that undertake the treatments to a subset 
of countries that do not, based on a set of observable country characteristics and global variables, 
represented by the vector Xi for the ith country.  This matching methodology controls for differences in the 
                                                          
40 Measured using the de facto floating exchange rate regime dummy from Ghosh et al. (2011).  
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treated and untreated groups that affect outcomes, such that the sampling bias is removed (at least any 
bias that is captured in the vector Xi).  In other words, the key equation summarizing this approach is:  
 
E[Y0,i|Xi, Di=1] = E[Y0,i|Xi, Di=0].         (A3) 
 
This basically requires that conditional on the vector of observable characteristics, the outcome variable is 
independent of the treatment status, (i.e., Y0, Y1 ┴  Di | X). If this assumption is satisfied, then the ATT can 
be estimated using two observable terms:  
 
ATT = E[Y1,i|Di=1, Xi ]  –  E[Y0,i|Di=0, Xi] .      (A4) 
 
This still leaves a multidimensional problem, due to the large set of continuous variables that could be 
included in Xi. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985), however, show that it is sufficient to match treated and 
control observations based on a “propensity score,” p(Xi), which is a scalar variable that is the probability 
that country i receives the treatment (Di).  More specifically, the propensity score is: 
 
p(Xi) = Pr[Di=1|Xi] .         (A5)   
 
In our case, the propensity score is the conditional probability of a country adjusting its CFMs given pre-
treatment characteristics, Xi, which include country-specific and global variables. This single propensity 
score reduces the number of dimensions over which observations must be matched.  Rubin and Thomas 
(1992) show that it is possible to estimate these propensity scores based on the vector of observable 
characteristics.  These propensity scores are traditionally estimated using a logit or probit regression.  
 
After the propensity scores have been estimated, there are several algorithms that can be used to match 
each treated observation with one or more untreated observations. We focus on five techniques: nearest 
neighbor without replacement, five-nearest neighbors (with replacement), radius with caliper, kernel, and 
local-linear.41
  
 Each algorithm differs based on the number of observations included in the control set and 
the weighting of these observations. 
                                                          
41 We apply these matching algorithms with the Stata module PSMATCH2, developed by Leuven and Sianesi 
(2003). The number of treated observations after matching is lower than reported in Table 1 because data is not 
available to estimate propensity scores for all observations. 
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In the simplest technique, nearest-neighbor matching, an observation from the control group is chosen as 
a match for a treated observation based on which control has the closest propensity score. This method 
“without replacement” requires that untreated observations are used only once, while this method “with 
replacement” allows untreated observations to be used more than once as a match. This method can be 
used with more than one “nearest-neighbor” as a control group—and we also estimate the model using 
five-nearest neighbors. The radius method uses the same basic approach, except includes all “nearest 
neighbors” which fall within a maximum radius (referred to as the caliper) based on the estimated 
propensity scores.42 The kernel and local-linear matching algorithms calculate a weighted average of all 
observations in the control group using nonparametric estimators which use generalized weighting 
functions to assign a higher weight to control observations closer to the treated observation.43
 
 The 
nearest-neighbor algorithm is basically an extreme form of kernel and local-linear matching, with all 
weight given to the closest propensity score.  
Each of these matching methodologies has advantages and disadvantages. Nearest neighbor is 
straightforward, easy to implement, and minimizes “bad” matches with control observations that have 
little in common with the treated observation. It is also straightforward to check which country is 
“matched” as the nearest neighbor in a control group. Nearest neighbor, however, ignores useful 
information from other countries in the control group. Radius, kernel, and local-linear matching use more 
information and therefore tend to have lower variances—but at the risk of including bad matches. Radius 
matching is less sophisticated than kernel and local-linear matching as it does not place greater weight on 
better matches within its “radius”. Fan (1992, 1993) shows that local-linear matching has several 
important advantages over kernel matching, such as a faster rate of convergence near boundary points and 
greater robustness to different data design densities.  
 
There are several test statistics that can be used to assess the accuracy of the matching and whether the 
algorithm removes any significant differences between the treated and control groups. The two most 
critical tests—of the “Common Support Condition” and “Balancing Assumption”—are discussed in 
Section 3.3 of the paper. There are also several additional statistics, however, which are useful to evaluate 
the effectiveness of each algorithm. These are reported in Table A1 for each of the three CFMs. Each 
section of the table lists the mean propensity scores for the treatment group, unmatched control group, and 
matched control group using each algorithm. In most cases, the mean propensity score for the control 
                                                          
42 We set the caliper at 0.005. 
43 The main difference between the two methods is the weighting functions. See Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd 
(1997, 1998) for a detailed description of the local-linear matching method.  
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group is closer to that of the treatment group after matching, indicating that the matched control group is 
more “similar” to the treatment group than the unmatched control group. According to this comparison, 
however, there is no matching algorithm that consistently performs best; local-linear matching yields a 
mean closest to the treatment group for inflow controls, nearest-neighbor is closest for macroprudential 
measures, and kernel is closest for outflow controls.  
 
Table A1 also reports the mean absolute bias (and standard deviation) of the treatment group relative to 
the unmatched control group and control groups using each of the matching algorithms. In each case, the 
matching reduces the mean absolute bias by a substantial amount, with different matching algorithms 
again performing better or worse based on the treatment. These statistics also capture the bias/efficiency 
trade-off inherent in selecting a matching technique. Methodologies such as nearest neighbor that only 
use one observation as the control group tend to have a lower mean absolute bias (as it only uses the most 
similar observation), but at the cost of ignoring other useful information and therefore having more 
imprecise estimates (and higher standard deviations). Methods that incorporate more observations in the 
control group (such as local-linear and kernel matching) should be more efficient as they incorporate 
more information, but at the cost of potentially have greater mean bias due to including poorer matches. 
There is no standard procedure to select a preferred matching algorithm based on this bias/efficiency 
tradeoff.  
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Table 1  
Capital-Flow Management Measures 
 Controls on 
Inflows 
 Controls on 
Outflows 
 Macroprudential 
Measures 
 Related to Pressures 
From Capital: 
 
 − +  − +  − +  Outflows Inflows Total 
Argentina 3 2  3 1  2 1  6 6 12 
Brazil 1 7  0 0  0 2  1 9 10 
Bulgaria 1 0  1 0  0 0  1 1 2 
Chile 0 0  1 0  0 0  0 1 1 
China 4 0  2 0  2 0  6 2 8 
Colombia 1 0  1 1  1 2  3 3 6 
Côte d'Ivoire 0 0  0 1  0 0  1 0 1 
Croatia 1 0  3 1  3 2  5 5 10 
Czech Republic 0 0  1 0  0 1  0 2 2 
Ecuador 0 0  0 1  0 0  1 0 1 
Ghana 0 0  0 0  0 1  0 1 1 
Hungary 0 0  0 0  1 2  1 2 3 
India 4 0  0 0  1 2  5 2 7 
Indonesia 0 2  0 0  0 4  0 6 6 
Israel 0 0  0 0  0 2  0 2 2 
Jamaica 0 0  0 0  1 2  1 2 3 
Kazakhstan 1 0  2 1  1 1  3 3 6 
Kenya 0 0  0 0  0 1  0 1 1 
Korea (South) 0 2  1 0  0 6  0 9 9 
Latvia 0 0  0 0  0 2  0 2 2 
Lebanon 0 0  1 0  0 2  0 3 3 
Malaysia 2 0  3 0  3 0  5 3 8 
Mexico 1 0  0 0  0 0  1 0 1 
Morocco 0 0  2 0  3 0  3 2 5 
Nigeria 1 0  0 0  0 0  1 0 1 
Oman 0 0  1 0  0 0  0 1 1 
Pakistan 0 1  0 0  1 1  1 2 3 
Peru 0 1  0 0  2 14  2 15 17 
Philippines 1 0  3 0  3 0  4 3 7 
Romania 0 0  0 0  3 1  3 1 4 
Russia 0 0  0 0  0 9  0 9 9 
South Africa 4 0  8 0  1 0  5 8 13 
Sri Lanka 2 0  2 0  1 0  3 2 5 
Taiwan 0 0  0 0  0 2  0 2 2 
Thailand 0 1  2 0  1 0  1 3 4 
Tunisia 0 0  1 0  1 0  1 1 2 
Turkey 0 0  2 0  5 4  5 6 11 
Ukraine 2 1  1 0  11 5  13 7 20 
Vietnam 0 4  0 1  2 3  3 7 10 
Total 29 21  42 7  49 72  85 135 220 
 
Notes: The “−” denotes the removal or easing of a control or macroprudential measure and the “+” denotes the 
addition or tightening of measure. Countries included in the sample which do not have a CFM event are: Australia, 
Bahrain, Botswana, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, Hong Kong, Jordan, Kuwait, Lithuania, New Zealand, Norway, 
Panama, Poland, Qatar, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, United Arab Emirates, and Zambia.  
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Table 2 
Predicting Real Exchange Rate Movements: OLS and Selection Bias 
 
 Full Sample  Floating Exchange Rate Regimes ONLY1 
 Excluding Floating 
Exchange Rate Regimes1 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) (7) 
          
Increased macroprudential   0.012** 0.013** 0.010*  0.004 0.004  0.041*** 0.051*** 
    regulations dummy2 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.005) (0.005)  (0.013) (0.016) 
          
Floating exchange rate  -0.000 0.002*       
    dummy1  (0.001) (0.001)       
          
Portfolio flows over last 6     0.000*   0.000   0.000 
    months (% change)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Consensus CPI,    0.001***   -0.000   0.001*** 
    52-week expectations    (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Private credit to GDP   -0.011***   -0.032***   0.000 
    (% change)   (0.004)   (0.008)   (0.005) 
VIX   -0.001***   -0.002***   -0.000*** 
   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
TED Spread   -0.003***   -0.004***   -0.005*** 
   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.002) 
Commodity prices    -0.020***   -0.039***   0.006 
    (% change)   (0.003)   (0.004)   (0.004) 
Interest rate vs. US rate   -0.000**   -0.001***   -0.000 
   (change in spread)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
FX Reserves/GDP   0.006***   0.008***   0.006*** 
  (% change)   (0.001)   (0.002)   (0.002) 
Capital account openness   0.002***   0.001   0.003*** 
        (0.000)   (0.001)   (0.001) 
Stock market cap.   -0.000   -0.000   -0.000 
   (% of GDP)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Log GDP per capita   -0.002***   -0.005***   -0.005*** 
   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001) 
Legal compliance   -0.204***   -0.729***   0.000 
     (0.046)   (0.069)   (0.059) 
Legal  compliance    0.049***   0.169***   0.002 
      Squared   (0.011)   (0.016)   (0.014) 
Constant 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.254***  0.004*** 0.878***  0.004*** 0.036 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.051)  (0.000) (0.078)  (0.000) (0.066) 
          
Observations 21,281 19,019 10,686  8,964 6,129  10,055 4,557 
R2 0.000 0.000 0.098  0.000 0.174  0.002 0.067 
 
Notes: OLS regressions predicting the percent change in the real exchange rate over the next quarter (13 weeks). Control 
variables are all lagged by one period and defined in Appendix B and Table 3. Robust standard errors. *** denotes significance at 
the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. 
(1) Floating exchange rate dummy is the de facto measure from Ghosh et al. (2011). 
(2) Increased macroprudential regulations dummy is a dummy equal to 1 if the country has increased macroprudential regulations 
in the current week, as defined in the database defined in Appendix A.  
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Table 3  
First-Stage Logit Regression Results Used to Calculate Propensity Scores 
 
 Controls on 
Capital Inflows 
(Increases) 
Controls on 
Capital Outflows 
(Decreases) 
Macroprudential 
Measures 
(Increases) 
Real exchange rate 11.222*** 6.006** 1.317 
   (% change) (3.045) (2.679) (1.937) 
Portfolio flows over last 6 months 0.001 0.004 0.000 
   (% change) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) 
Consensus CPI,  0.207* -0.148 0.337*** 
   52-week expectations  (0.123) (0.098) (0.067) 
Private credit to GDP 0.652 1.157 4.501** 
   (% change) (2.904) (2.776) (1.778) 
VIX 0.052 -0.032 -0.045 
 (0.046) (0.047) (0.028) 
TED Spread -2.381 1.077 -0.646 
 (1.693) (1.744) (0.972) 
Commodity prices (% change) -0.334 -2.536* 0.217 
 (1.778) (1.343) (0.832) 
Interest rate vs. US -0.037 -0.031 0.042 
   (change in overnight rate) (0.143) (0.069) (0.055) 
FX Reserves/GDP -0.663 -0.846 -0.817 
  (% change) (0.798) (0.773) (0.731) 
Floating ER dummy -0.349 0.488 1.615*** 
 (0.535) (0.572) (0.367) 
Capital account openness -0.097 -1.008*** 0.579*** 
      (0.369) (0.242) (0.149) 
Stock market capitalization -0.012* 0.006** -0.000 
   (% of GDP) (0.006) (0.003) (0.001) 
Log GDP per capita 0.224 0.802** 0.052 
 (0.398) (0.354) (0.225) 
Legal compliance -17.397 105.058** 79.502*** 
   (21.175) (42.824) (24.894) 
Legal  compliance squared 3.100 -25.638** -18.826*** 
       (5.031) (10.254) (5.837) 
Observations 4,953 4,708 4,394 
Pseudo R2 0.192 0.222 0.155 
 
Notes: Results of logit regressions predicting the probability of a change in the CFM listed at the top in each week. CFM events 
are summarized in Table 1 and an “exclusion window” is created for the 3 months before and after each event. Explanatory 
variables are defined in Appendix B. Robust standard errors. Changes are calculated over 52 weeks in order to adjust for any 
seasonal effects. Constant is included in regression and not reported above.* indicates significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% 
level and *** at the 1% level. 
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Table 4 
Increased Controls on Capital Inflows:  
Means for Treated and Control Groups using Different Matching Algorithms 
 
 Mean:  
Treated
Group 
(μT) 
Mean: 
Unmatched 
Control 
(μC) 
t-
Statistics 
(H0: μT = 
μC) 
 Nearest Neighbor (no replacement)  
5-Nearest 
Neighbors  
Radius with 
Caliper  Kernel  Local-linear 
 
 
Mean: 
Matched 
Control 
t-stat  
Mean: 
Matched 
Control 
t-stat  
Mean: 
Matched 
Control 
t-stat  
Mean 
Matched 
Control 
t-stat  
Mean 
Matched 
Control 
t-stat 
Real ER 0.090 0.008 4.21***  0.093 -0.12  0.100 -0.32  0.068 -0.15  0.039 1.36  0.099 -0.33 
Portfolio flows  0.401 -2.541 0.21  3.346 -0.99  -9.611 0.46  -1.073 0.15  -2.163 0.19  1.955 -0.58 
Consensus CPI 7.156 4.158 4.78***  6.675 0.43  6.620 0.49  6.492 0.14  4.433 2.30**  6.115 1.03 
Credit growth 0.044 0.026 0.99  0.021 0.75  0.027 0.57  0.037 0.34  0.030 0.52  0.012 1.12 
 
   
    
 
          
VIX 25.752 26.482 -0.39  28.132 -0.93  24.917 0.35  25.592 -0.43  26.357 -0.51  27.791 -0.82 
TED 0.268 0.351 -1.39  0.275 -0.17  0.244 0.52  0.292 -0.32  0.331 -0.88  0.271 -0.08 
Commodities 0.068 -0.007 1.30  0.038 0.48  0.090 -0.35  0.057 0.02  0.016 0.64  0.058 0.18 
Interest rate - US -0.523 -0.149 -0.56  -0.596 0.03  -1.093 0.25  -0.423 -0.16  -0.396 -0.16  -1.006 0.22 
 
   
    
 
          
FX Reserves/GDP 0.080 0.084 -0.06  0.108 -0.37  0.089 -0.13  0.085 -0.01  0.095 -0.20  0.134 -0.73 
Floating ER 0.667 0.744 -0.81  0.714 -0.33  0.667 0.00  0.681 0.26  0.760 -0.42  0.714 -0.33 
CA openness 0.073 1.016 -2.97***  0.159 -0.27  0.126 -0.16  0.259 -0.47  0.874 -2.07**  0.234 -0.51 
Stock market cap. 43.231 84.666 -1.98**  47.565 -0.36  47.698 -0.41  52.349 -0.44  78.437 -1.61  48.162 -0.40 
 
   
    
 
          
GDP per capita 8.443 9.295 -3.26***  8.498 -0.19  8.429 0.05  8.575 -0.04  9.200 -2.04**  8.535 -0.31 
Legal compliance 2.046 2.229 -3.82***  2.033 0.26  2.045 0.03  2.094 -0.96  2.180 -2.16**  2.029 0.32 
Legal  comp. 2 4.216 5.018 -3.76***  4.157 0.27  4.212 0.02  4.425 -0.97  4.807 -2.20**  4.144 0.33 
Mean Propensity 
Score 420.6 498.7   499.3   446.8   491.4   466.8   445.3  
Observations 21 4932   21   21   18   20   21  
 
Notes: Reports difference in means between treated and control groups, with control group created based on regression results reported in Table 3 and matching performed using 
algorithms listed at top. See Table 3 and Appendix B for detailed variable definitions. * indicates significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. 
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Appendix Table A1  
Summary of Results for Different Matching Algorithms 
 
 
 
Unmatched 
Control 
Group 
 Matched Control Group Based on Matching Algorithm: 
 
Treatment 
Group 
 
Nearest 
Neighbor (no 
replacement) 
5 Nearest 
Neighbors 
Radius with 
Caliper Kernel 
Local-
linear 
Increased controls on capital inflows         Mean propensity score 420.6 498.7  499.3 446.8 491.4 466.8 445.3 
    Mean absolute bias  
           (standard deviation)  
47.32  
(36.68)  
9.93  
(7.96) 
8.21   
(6.95) 
10.17 
(9.53) 
36.89 
(27.11) 
12.94  
(10.35) 
    Observations on support 21 4932  21 21 18 20 21 
     
Increased macroprudential measures     
    Mean propensity score 548.1 476.7  548.7 564.5 566.6 521.3 588.3 
    Mean absolute bias  
           (standard deviation)  
33.15 
(21.13)  
8.15  
(6.01) 
5.42  
(3.73) 
3.23  
(1.98) 
18.27 
(11.96) 
8.01  
(5.37) 
    Observations on support 59 4335  59 59 58 59 59 
     
Decreased controls on capital outflows     
    Mean propensity score 439.0 496.8  559.2 506.9 487.3 464.3 495.4 
    Mean absolute bias  
           (standard deviation)  
38.50  
(32.83)  
10.29  
(6.32) 
6.17  
(3.20) 
6.19  
(4.42) 
9.19 
(6.48) 
21.55  
(20.38) 
    Observations on support 29 4679  29 29 27 29 29 
 
Notes: Statistics and tests from use of matching algorithms discussed in Section 3.3 and Appendix C.  
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Figure 1 
Incidence of Different Types of CFMs: 2009 – 2011 
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Figure 2a 
Average Treatment Effects of CFMs Using Local-Linear Matching: Exchange Rates and Portfolio Flows 
 
       % Change in Nominal Exchange Rate1                   % Change in Real Exchange Rate1   Change in Net Portfolio Inflows2  
   
   
    
Notes: (1) Based on a broad exchange rate index. (2) Net portfolio inflows are cumulative flows over the last 13 weeks and measured as a percent of total portfolio assets lagged one 
period before the CFM event. 
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Figure 2b 
Average Treatment Effects of CFMs Using Five-Nearest Neighbors: Exchange Rates and Portfolio Flows 
 
       % Change in Nominal Exchange Rate1                   % Change in Real Exchange Rate1   Change in Net Portfolio Inflows2  
   
   
    
Notes: (1) Based on a broad exchange rate index. (2) Net portfolio inflows are cumulative flows over the last 13 weeks and measured as a percent of total portfolio assets lagged 
one period before the CFM event. 
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Figure 3 
Average Treatment Effects of CFMs: Interest Rates, Equity Indices and Portfolio Flow Volatility 
 
       Change in Interest Rate Differential1                          % Change in Equity Index                 Volatility in Net Portfolio Inflows2  
   
   
    
Notes: (1) Interest rate differential versus U.S. rate for 3-month Treasury bills. (2) Volatility of net portfolio inflows, defined as standard deviation over previous 26 weeks. 
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Figure 4 
Average Treatment Effects of CFMs: Financial Vulnerabilities 
 
               Change in Expected Inflation1                                               % Change in Private Credit/GDP                        % Change in Portfolio Share in Liabilities2   
           Increased Macroprudential Measures                                  Increased Controls on Inflows                     Increased Macroprudential Measures  
      
   
       % Change in Bank Leverage3              % Change in Bank Credit4  
                 Increased Macroprudential Measures   Increased Macroprudential Measures                
    
 
 
 
 
Notes: (1) Consensus inflation forecasts over the next year. (2) Portfolio investment liabilities as a share of total liabilities. (3) Bank leverage measured by ratio of bank credit to bank 
deposits.  (4) Bank credit is private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to GDP.  
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Figure 5 
Average Treatment Effects of “Major” CFMs: Portfolio Flows, Volatility, and the Exchange Rate 
 
       Change in Net Portfolio Inflows1                 Change in Volatility of Net Portfolio Inflows1        % Change in Real Exchange Rate  
      
      
       
Notes: Major CFMs are changes in capital controls and macroprudential measures which received mention by financial analysts and in financial publications. (1) Net portfolio inflows 
are cumulative flows over the last 13 weeks and measured as a percent of total portfolio assets lagged one period before the CFM event. Volatility is measured as the standard deviation 
over the previous 26 weeks. 
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